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Abstract 
The growing trend of computer network attacks provokes the necessity for a 
comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter aggressors from attacking U.S. critical 
infrastructure. The current U.S. cyber deterrence strategy based on punishment is 
ineffective in deterring aggressors as evidenced by the increasing number of computer 
network attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. should look 
towards an alternative strategy based on robustness to deny enemy objectives and absorb 
attacks. To identify the superior cyber deterrence strategy, this study uses a qualitative 
assessment based on open-sourced information to evaluate the effectiveness of each 
strategy. The findings of this study show that a deterrence strategy centered on robustness 
can be more effective in deterring aggressors. As a result, the United States would be 
better served to reform its cyber deterrence strategy by establishing a capability to absorb 
computer network attacks and deny enemy objectives as a deterrent. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The United States (U.S.) has been consistently victimized by computer network 
attack (CNAs) from state and non-state actors, with the annual number of CNAs against 
U.S. critical infrastructure having increased seventeen-fold since 2009.
1
 The current state 
of the debate on how serious the threat posed by such attacks is and what to do about it is 
divided between alarmists and cynics. Alarmists, such as former U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta, advocate that the growing trend of CNAs against the United States 
increases the likelihood for a strategically placed CNA to generate the equivalent of a 
cyber Pearl Harbor. While clearly not a direct parallel, a cyber Pearl Harbor is used as an 
analogy for the catastrophic damage and disruption to daily life that can arise when a 
CNA is used to destabilize critical infrastructure. While speaking at the Intrepid Sea, Air, 
and Space Museum in New York, Panetta described the increasing technological 
aggressiveness of states, like China, and non-state actors, such as the now famous 
hactivist collective known as Anonymous, can derail critical infrastructure in the United 
States.
2
 For example, Mandiant, a private cybersecurity firm, has recently attributed a 
new wave of CNAs against private firms directly connected to the U.S. electric grid to 
                                                             
1 Sanger, David E., and Eric Schmitt. “Rise Is Seen in Cyberattacks Targeting U.S. Infrastructure.” The     
New York Times, July 26, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/us/cyberattacks-are-up-national-
security-chief-says.html?_r=0. 
2 Bumiller, Elisabeth, and Thom Shanker. "Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack                  on 
U.S."The New York Times, October 11, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-
of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Chinese state-sponsored hackers. Other policymakers, such as U.S. Representative Trent 
Franks, have echoed Panetta’s rhetoric, warning “If we don’t change our course, national 
electric grids could be headed for disaster.” 3 To prevent such a catastrophic occurrence, 
alarmists have argued one key option to decrease the likelihood of a cyber Pearl Harbor is 
to strike or retaliate against the aggressor.
4
  
Cynics, like cryptologist Bruce Schneier, refute this analogy as an exaggeration 
used for political gain or funding.
 
Although the potential consequences of a CNA on U.S. 
critical infrastructure can be severe, cynics argue that such an event does not pose an 
existential threat to the United States. However, such consequences are possible and 
mitigating them must be accounted for. Cynics advocate that preventing these 
consequences by threatening force against possible aggressors is not the answer. Schneier 
argues that the U.S. should focus on cyber defense and bolster the resiliency of its critical 
infrastructure as an alternative to using force. Nevertheless, alarmists have come to 
dominate the policy debate. Their solution of choice is cyber deterrence, coercing 
aggressive actors from attacking the state via cyberspace, whether in the form of a CNA 
or otherwise, through threats of pre-emptive action and retaliation.
 5
 
                                                             
3 Burgess, James. "Chinese Military Renews Cyber-Attacks, Focusing on US Electrical Grid." Oil Prices & 
Energy News: Crude Oil Price Charts, Investment Advice. Last modified May 23, 2013. 
http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Chinese-Military-Renews-Cyber-Attacks-Focusing-
on-US-Electrical-Grid.html. 
4 Bumiller and Shanker. “Panetta warns of dire threat of cyberattack on u.s.” The New York Times. 
5 Armending, Taylor. "Security Experts Push Back at 'Cyber Pearl Harbor' Warning." CSO. Last modified 
November 7, 2012. http://www.csoonline.com/article/720930/security-experts-push-back-at-cyber-pearl-
harbor-warning. 
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Alarmists within policymaking circles have, as their fundamental understanding 
of cyber deterrence, a Cold War perspective. These policymakers subscribe to deterring 
aggressive actors by threatening force against the aggressor or their valued interests. Such 
tactics are comparable to U.S. deterrence strategies formulated against the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War and through which the U.S. threatened to utilize its nuclear arsenal 
against the Soviet Union should it attack the homeland, its allies, or its vital interests. 
Similarly, the present U.S. cyber deterrence strategy (USCDS) threatens to preemptively 
strike or respond against aggressors should they attack U.S. critical infrastructure through 
cyberspace. In reality, the United States has yet to achieve the same success in deterring 
enemies in cyberspace as it did deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
evidenced by the consistency of CNAs against U.S. critical infrastructure. This reality 
lends credence to the notion that current USCDS based on Cold War strategies is 
ineffective in deterring America’s enemies.  
There is a fundamental and contextual difference between the current USCDS and 
the Cold War tradition model that explains the failure of U.S. cyber deterrence. During 
the Cold War, the United States prevented an enemy that had not acted, and it turns out, 
was already deterred, at least following the establishment of mutual nuclear arsenals. 
Deterrence strategies during the Cold War were not designed to prevent an enemy 
already striking at U.S. interests, a far more daunting task. Unlike its conflict with the 
Soviet Union, the United States is faced with enemies who have already and continue to 
attack via cyberspace. This fundamental difference fosters the need to first re-establish 
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and then maintain deterrence against reoccurring attacks. The current USCDS fails to 
address these necessities given the increasing number of CNAs against the United States. 
Thus, deterrence under the Cold War perspective is not the answer. The realities 
of the present cyber environment, such as the inability to prevent all threats posed to the 
BES or the evolving offensive cyber capabilities of U.S. rivals, demonstrates the 
necessity for a different approach to cyber deterrence. I believe a USCDS based on 
robustness, where critical infrastructure is able to absorb CNAs while ensuring continuity 
of service and denying the enemy’s objectives, can address these realities. Traditionally, 
deterrence is achieved by persuading aggressive actors, whether with the threat of force 
or by denying their objectives, from attacking the state and to maintain their deterred 
behavior. For the purposes of this discussion, I assert that the same should be true for a 
USCDS based on robustness as the U.S. can threaten to deny enemy objectives by 
absorbing CNAs, persuade aggressors from attacking via cyberspace, and then maintain 
their deterred behavior, in the future. 
Prior to delving further into the issue, there is a fundamental empirical concern 
that must be addressed.   Like other national security issues that are highly government-
centric, such as terrorism for example, significant and relevant information regarding 
both attacks and steps taken in response to CNA efforts against the U.S. government are 
unavailable to this research effort.  For example, not included here is comprehensive 
information from the National Security Agency (NSA) or the U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM), both of which are leading federal agencies in any effort at cyber-
defense.   Thus, due to access and classification issues, there is no way to build a 
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quantitative assessment of the current effectiveness of the USCDS or any alternative 
approaches based on anything approaching a population or even highly reliable sampling 
frame of real world data.   To avoid the potential internal and external validity issues that 
would come from any effort to sample from the available data without a real 
understanding of the population as a whole, this study analyzes only open-sourced 
information be it from the Executive Office of the President, the Department of 
Homeland Security, corporate security sources, and academic and other research.  
This information was used to specifically assess whether the current USCDS is 
more effective in deterring aggressors than an alternative USCDS based on robustness via 
a qualitative assessment to identify the superior USCDS.  The assessment evaluates the 
effectiveness of each USCDS by comparing their capabilities to address eight specific 
criteria that any meaningful cyber-defense effort would desire to maximize: the 
attribution problem, scalability, contestability, the regulation problem, the Spy-VS-Treaty 
problem, socio-political costs, and economic costs.  In this way, it is possible to logically 
evaluate how effective the current cyber-deterrence approach advocated by the Obama 
Administration’s USCDS is in addressing the current array of known threats, construct an 
alternative approach that maximizes the ability to provide meaningful cyber-defense in 
the form of robustness, and then compare, using these common criteria, the two 
approaches following laying out how robustness would apply to the Bulk Electrical 
System (BES) as a single, demonstrating case study.   Based on the results of the 
qualitative assessment, I am able to claim that an alternative USCDS based on robustness 
is more effective in deterring aggressors and minimizing the threat posed by CNAs than 
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the Obama Administration’s USCDS.  This means that the United States government 
must re-evaluate its national strategy towards cyber deterrence and the protection of its 
critical infrastructure. If the alternative USCDS based on robustness is implemented, the 
U.S. government should also take measures to mitigate the limitations of its future 
USCDS to maximize the strategy’s effectiveness. 
The thesis executes this analysis in the following manner.  Chapter Two, explores, 
from an historical standpoint, the nature of the threat posed by cyber-attackers, the debate 
surrounding cyber deterrence during the 1990s, and how the Cold War philosophy 
towards deterrence has shaped alarmist policymakers’ development of a cyber deterrence 
strategy based on punishment. Then, it will be possible to analyze current White House 
policies on cyber deterrence, such as the International Strategy for Cyberspace, to 
illustrate their limitations and ineffectiveness on deterring aggressors. Chapter Three 
proposes an alternative USCDS based on robustness designed to deny enemy objectives. 
My proposed strategy is framed with the analysis of Robert Art and Robert Pape’s work 
to determine whether denial deterrence, when the aggressor is undermined to the point 
where it begins to doubt its own strategy and thus does not engage in hostilities, is viable 
in cyberspace.
6
 Upon concluding that denial deterrence is indeed viable, I then discuss 
the necessary criteria, identified by cybersecurity scholars such as Richard Andres and 
Jeffrey Cooper, which a successful cyber deterrence strategy must address and overcome. 
Chapter Four applies my proposed USCDS to the Bulk Electric System (BES) through 
examples of defensive postures and redundancy, as well the ability to tailor a response 
                                                             
6 Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 4-6. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1996. 
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against a CNA. Chapter Five presents a qualitative analysis to assess which USCDS, my 
proposed strategy based on robustness or the current strategy based on punishment, is 
more effective in deterring cyber-attackers. I use information collected from secondary 
sources, such as the RAND Corporation and the Executive Office of the President, to 
identify whether each USCDS can address eight criteria affecting cyber deterrence. 
I conclude in Chapter Six with a discussion of my findings drawn from the 
qualitative analysis presented in the previous chapter. The assessment shows that the 
alternative USCDS based on robustness can be more effective than the current strategy. 
This is due to the fact that it mitigates most of the factors limiting cyber deterrence as 
opposed to the current USCDS; thus, the proposed alternative strategy has a potential for 
greater success in deterring aggressors from attacking critical infrastructure via 
cyberspace. However, there are some factors limiting the alternative USCDS in the wake 
of sequestration in the United States and a polarized Congress. As a result, I also develop 
three recommendations to mitigate the limitations of the alternative USCDS and increase 
its viability.  
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Chapter 2: U.S. Cyber Deterrence; A Review 
The dynamic nature of cyberspace has frustrated policymakers in their attempt to 
preserve U.S. national security and protect assets in an environment as dynamic as 
cyberspace. Cyber security is a muddled subject as the United States continues to counter 
attacks from both state and non-state attackers. If one cannot keep up with elusive 
aggressors that continue to come up with new ways to conduct cyber-attackers against the 
United States, then the simplest way to address this issue is to make the costs of such an 
attack greater than its benefits. Chapter 2 will review the nature of cybersecurity, the 
history of American cyber deterrence, and discuss the current official cyber strategy. 
Realities of Cybersecurity 
One reality hindering cyber security frameworks is the reality that cyber-defense 
capabilities do not evolve at the same rate as offensive capabilities. The speed by which 
malware, viruses, and other malicious programs evolve cannot be matched by the 
preventative measures developed by government agencies and the private sector. For 
example, the 2010 discovery of the Stuxnet virus came with the realization that the 
program had gone undetected for months. The virus targeted energy installations across 
the world and was only discovered after damage had been incurred. One reason behind 
the sluggish evolution of cyber defenses is the inadequate number of qualified personnel 
to create and administer cyber security protocols for critical infrastructure. Using the 
Bulk Electric System as an example, the movement towards implementing Smart Grids in 
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the United States will require two to three times more professional technicians to 
administer North America’s electric grids and secure them from potential threats. As 
critical infrastructure becomes more integrated and interconnected, their vulnerabilities 
will drastically increase due to the lack of trained professionals with the knowledge and 
understanding of delivery systems security risks. Given the dynamic nature of offensive 
cyber capabilities, it is only a matter of time before current prevention strategies become 
obsolete.
 7
  
This leads to the next reality inhibiting cyber-defense frameworks; the United 
States is unable to prevent every single cyber-attack against it. Based on the notion that 
defensive capabilities evolve at a slower rate, it is highly improbable that the U.S. can 
identify and destroy all digital threats to its critical infrastructure. This is evident by the 
consistent intrusions against U.S. cyberspace by malicious cyber-attackers.  Only after 
this key assumption has been accepted can the development of successful strategy for 
cyber-defense be developed. In summary, both realities obstruct the effectiveness of U.S. 
cyber deterrence as malicious hackers have an offensive advantage that emboldens rather 
than deters aggressors. The United States must look towards other means and strategies to 
be able to counter cyber-attacks; even if these attacks can’t be prevented.8  
 
 
                                                             
7 U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System: A Jointly-Commissioned Summary 
Report of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
November 2009 Workshop. 2010. Accessed February 17, 2013. http://www.nerc.com/files/HILF.pdf. 
8 Ibid. 
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Cyber Capabilities and Threats 
Although there are a number of obstacles that can inhibit a target’s cyber 
deterrence framework, the ultimate threat is the attacker and its capabilities. There are 
two forms of capabilities that characterize a cyber-attack; man-made deliberate threats 
and untargeted attacks. A man-made deliberate attack (MMDA) is defined as the use of 
malicious capabilities to attack a specific system or network of critical infrastructure by a 
state, group, or individual (e.g., disgruntled employees, states, criminal syndicates, or 
hackers). An example of this form of attack includes the use of a vector, such as a worm, 
virus, or other malicious software, to target a specific system from a designated target. 
Conversely, an untargeted attack (UA) occurs when the target of an attack is undefined. 
These attacks often employ the same vectors as a MMDA despite the lack of a target, 
such as the release of malicious software onto the internet in order to create a botnet. 
Both attacks will utilize the same vectors for attack with the sole difference being the 
intent. Vectors include denial of service attacks, reconnaissance attacks, unauthorized 
access attacks, and collateral damage.
9
  
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
One of the most effective weapons at a cyber-terrorist’s disposal is a distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack. This capability targets the communication protocols of a 
server in order to disrupt the operational commands being distributed within the server.
 10 
 
                                                             
9 U.S. Department of Energy. Roadmap To Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity. 2011. 
Accessed May 20, 2013. http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity 
Roadmap_finalweb.pdf. 
10 U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System. 
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The strategy behind this attack is to flood the server with an astronomical number of 
commands to the point where the server is either unable to process the flood or requests 
or its operating speed is lowered.
11
 This form of attack is a man-made deliberate attack.  
DDoS attacks are not a new phenomenon but have recently garnered world-wide 
attention because of its use by cyber-terrorist groups such as Anonymous. Anonymous 
has utilized DDoS attacks to disrupt services rendered by corporate goliaths such as 
Mastercard and PayPal. U.S. government servers are also at risk from DDoS attacks, as 
illustrated by attacks attributed to Anonymous on the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Copyright Office, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency homepage.
12
 Although many 
of these attributed DDoS attacks have targeted U.S. government and corporate entities, 
there is nothing prohibiting the use of this low technology but highly effective capability 
to target critical infrastructure in the United States. 
Reconnaissance and Eavesdropping Attacks 
Not all attacks are designed to disrupt company services, or in the case of the 
electric grid, disrupt the flow of electricity. Cyber-terrorists are just as keen to collect 
information on their targets as they are to maim or destroy them. To successfully engage 
in this form of cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorists will use reconnaissance attacks to gather 
information on public entities or private citizens. Reconnaissance attacks collect 
information on the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. Cyber-attackers spend a 
significant amount of time observing their target’s defense mechanisms and how 
                                                             
11 Ibid. 
12 Albanesius, Chloe. "Anonymous Takes Down CIA Web Site." PCMAG. Last modified February 10, 
2012. http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2400140,00.asp. 
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information is transmitted. For example, they will determine the strength of the target’s 
firewall or the type of systems that they are using to manage their cyber defenses. In the 
case of public utilities, cyber-attackers will assess the security of the target’s 
infrastructure and the level of security guarding confidential customer information 
pertaining to customers. Once information has been obtained regarding the target’s 
network information, host information, security policies, and personnel or customer 
information, cyber-terrorists can pinpoint the exact vulnerabilities of their target and 
tailor their attacks accordingly.
13
  
There are two forms of reconnaissance attacks at the disposal of cyber-attackers. 
First, passive reconnaissance employs covert means of infiltration and espionage with the 
goal of this leaving minimal evidence or traces showing an infiltration of a server. The 
best example of passive reconnaissance is illustrated by the recent discovery of the Flame 
virus by a Russian information technology security firm. Operating across the world 
since 2010, Flame is a malware program designed to attack computers run by the 
Microsoft Windows operating system. Flame is designed to record audio, screenshots, 
keyboard activity, and network traffic. The program has been known to record Skype, a 
global online communication service, conversations. The malware spreads from 
computer to computer through a computer’s Bluetooth function, spreading to other 
systems that contained the wireless data exchange program. Once data on the targeted 
system has been collected, the malware is designed to transmit the data to designated 
command servers scattered across the world and await further instructions. This program 
                                                             
13 U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System. 
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has been dubbed the most sophisticated and most complex malware ever found; leading 
experts to suspect it was created by a state actor for the purpose of espionage. The second 
form of reconnaissance attacks are active attacks. This form is characterized by overtly 
attempting to collect information without discretion. Such an overt strategy can be 
accomplished through intrusive means such as scanning. Scanning is used by cyber-
terrorists to every port number of a specific Internet Protocol (IP) address to determine 
which ports are open and in operational use. This measure is intrusive because the target 
can be alerted to the scan and it results in strange connections to the target’s server.14 
Collateral Damage 
When cyber-attackers attempt to inflict damage upon targets, there is a strong 
likelihood that their attacks will have secondary impacts. Collateral damage, in 
cyberspace, is defined as the unplanned side-effects of cyber-attacks. This can occur in 
many different ways, whether planned or not. In the case of defending critical 
infrastructure, collateral damage may target many different entities at once, including 
infrastructure, civilians, or government agencies. For example, a cyber-attacker 
attempting to disrupt power in Manhattan can unintentionally spark a power surge in 
adjacent grids in New England. When the disruption occurs, the power surge will travel 
through connected transmission lines across the region resulting in loss of power in 
Vermont and New Hampshire. Collateral damage in this example can affect public utility 
workers servicing transmission lines impacted by the surge. Continuing with the 
example; when the blackout in Manhattan occurs, the excess energy will surge through 
                                                             
14 Brown, Chris. "Phases of a Cyber-attack / Cyber-Recon." United States Naval Academy. Accessed 
July 17, 2013. http://www.usna.edu/CS/si110arch/si110AY12F/lec/l32/lec.html. 
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transmission lines being serviced by public utility workers, injuring or killing them in the 
process. This form of attack is untargeted, because cyber-terrorists are uncertain about the 
after-effects sparked by collateral damage. However, it is very likely that these cyber-
attacks are planned to result in collateral damage with greater human and infrastructure 
casualties.
15
 
Unauthorized Access Attacks 
The most dangerous capability at a cyber-attacker’s disposal is the use of 
unauthorized access attacks. This capability allows cyber-terrorists to exercise a degree of 
control over targeted systems to steal or manipulate data without authorization. This 
manipulation of assets, service, or information can result in disastrous implications, as 
system operators will be exposed to compromised data that can influence their decision-
making calculus and negatively impact the system. In the case of the electric grid, this 
form of attack would target operational commands between power nodes. In this 
scenario, operational commands can be manipulated to generate harmful amounts of 
electricity that can cause power surges or other potential complications.
16
 
MMDA and UAs can easily be used against critical infrastructure to cause severe 
socio-political and economic costs that can cripple the United States. These forms of 
attack can directly target critical infrastructure or use them as weapons to cause further 
chaos. These grim possibilities make cyber deterrence a vital necessity to protect the 
United States and deter enemies from striking its most vulnerable infrastructure by any of 
                                                             
15 U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System. 
16 Ibid. 
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a number of means. To lend further credibility to this threat is the fact that precedence for 
targeting critical infrastructure has already been set through the use of the Stuxnet virus 
on Iranian energy infrastructure. Although the U.S. has officially admitted to using the 
Stuxnet virus, the attack did set precedence for how an attack on critical infrastructure 
would go about. Furthermore, the U.S. attack on Iranian infrastructure has opened the 
floodgates for similar attacks to be waged in the United States. The only fashion to 
effectively stop state and non-state actors from launching an attack similar to the Stuxnet 
virus in the United States is to effectively deter them.  
The History of U.S. Cyber Deterrence 
President Obama remarked in 2009, “the very technologies that empower us to 
create and to build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy.”17 Those words 
echo the belief that America has become so dependent upon its technology that cyber 
space stretches across every segment of the economy and, of course, the heart of 
American society. For example, the BES is among the sectors most heavily dependent 
upon cyberspace. The majority of SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) 
systems used by operator(s) of the Bulk Electric System (OBES) issue commands across 
their segment of the national grid, as they also remain linked in one way or another to 
anyone desiring to access the system. Through its connection to the company network 
that also contains access to the Internet or through remote terminal units with wireless 
connectivity; more devices within the electric grid are becoming interconnected with 
                                                             
17 Obama, Barack H. Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and 
Communications Infrastructure. Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2009. Accessed 
March 15, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
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cyberspace. This trend will continue as OBES experiment with Smart Grids and Smart 
Meters to increase efficiency and sustainability. This technology, as discussed in Chapter 
1, has left OBES vulnerable to malicious actors who can access Smart Meters remotely 
through cyberspace. As such, the need for an effective cyber defense strategy is more 
pressing than ever, with cyber deterrence as the preferred option. Yet cyber-deterrence 
has been a topic for discussion for the past twenty years and predates the publicized 
cyber-attacks on Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008), and was first discussed during the 
Gulf War in the 1990s. 
Net War V. Cyber War (1990-2000) 
In 1990, the Saddam Hussein’s Iraq launched an offensive campaign to capture 
valuable oil fields from its smaller neighbor, Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait and 
subsequent hostile rhetoric towards neighboring Saudi Arabia by Hussein resulted in the 
passage of U.N. Resolution 678 in November 1990. This UN resolution authorized the 
use of force to enforce UN Resolution 660, which had demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm and UN Resolution 660 ushered in a new 
era of information warfare using offensive cyber capabilities. Information warfare was 
used by the United States and its UN coalition partners to exploit information to 
compliment its conventional warfare strategy against Iraq. The Gulf War was viewed as 
an instance of cyber war in which information technology was operationalized by one 
state military against another. In contrast, net wars are different from cyber wars because 
they occur from societal conflicts that include non-state actors.  This key distinction 
separating state from non-state cyber-attackers shaped early frameworks for a proposed 
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comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy. Policymakers and academic scholars argue that 
deterring a state actor was a different challenge than deterring a non-state actor.
18
 State 
actors respond to costly signals such as strong military postures or economic sanctions. 
As a result, it is much easier to deter a state actor with the threat of retaliation than deter 
non-state actors with the same strategy.
19
  
In contrast, non-state actors are more difficult to coerce due to their lack of high 
valued assets, their ability to cloak themselves into their environment, and the difficulty 
to signal them.
20
 The asymmetric nature of non-state actors provides them with an 
advantage against organized state actors, making deterrence difficult to achieve. More 
importantly, a net war against a non-state actor would require the implementation of 
deterrence by denial designed to deny the enemy from achieving its goals, attributing the 
enemy, and successfully retaliating against the enemy. Moreover, scholars believe that 
the implementation of an objective denial strategy would only dissuade the enemy, 
inducing restraint and reducing its capabilities.
21
 This resulted in a debate regarding the 
effectiveness of net war deterrence relative to the classical approach of using a strong 
cyber posture and costly signals to deter state actors. Some believe that deterrence was 
merely a by-product of a greater strategy based on the perception of retaliatory 
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capabilities.
22
 However, opposing scholars believed that deterrence can be achieved 
through America’s technical prowess to threaten what enemy’s hold dear and thereby 
influence their decision-making calculus.
23
 
From Perceptions to Attacks (2001-2008) 
The new millennium ushered in a new era for cyber security as digital attacks 
became more sophisticated and the implications increased exponentially. The discussion 
among scholars and policymakers regarding creating a national deterrence strategy 
changed from one based on perception management to a concern with deterring 
computer-based attacks on critical infrastructure. Most significantly, the cyber security 
community began to realize the importance of countering attacks such as cyber 
espionage, crime and terrorism. Emphasis was then placed on preventing those types of 
attack from occurring and increasing protective measures in cyberspace. Thus, a 
formidable deterrence strategy was needed to ensure that the possibility of attack would 
be more deleterious than advantageous to the aggressor.
24
  
On the other hand, many scholars and policymakers believed that cyber 
deterrence can never be achieved. According to Patrick Morgan, the previous discussions 
on a national deterrence framework fail to identify conditions for deterrence. First, 
previous strategies fail to take into consideration the rationality of attackers given the 
inclusion of non-state actors and the different motivations they may have relative to state 
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actors. Second, the inclusion of non-state actors makes any form of retaliation 
challenging due to the difficulty of attribution. Many scholars acknowledge the 
challenges of attribution, but still consider deterrence through punishment as a viable 
option against non-state actors. Third, it was difficult to ascertain an attacker’s assets to 
exploit with the threat of punishment.  Fourth, the absence of proper rules of engagement 
as agreed upon by the international community creates an issue of scalability and 
increases the risk of losing international social capital should the United States fail to 
respond appropriately. Fifth, little stability in response makes the chances of a physical 
conflict between the attacker and the target more likely. The sixth and final point as to 
why cyber deterrence is unattainable, according to Morgan, is the notion that there exists 
no such severe conflict in the military sense, making retaliation difficult to legally 
justify.
25
 
Morgan’s opinion of cyber deterrence was derived from the application of nuclear 
deterrence strategies to cyberspace. Cyberspace is more complex and dynamic than the 
mutually assured destruction that made nuclear deterrence possible during the Cold War. 
Retaliating against an enemy in cyberspace is still possible, but is it the preferred 
strategy? As cyber-attacks on the U.S. and its allies continued to rise, scholars debated 
whether cyber deterrence should focus on the concept of mitigation attacks and objective 
denial, or take a Cold War perspective through punitive deterrence. A breakthrough 
ultimately emerged in the academic work of Richard Harknett and his views on denial 
deterrence. Harknett debated whether denial could even be considered a form of 
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deterrence; once the enemy is denied, it is not deterred despite the possibility that the next 
attack may be.
26
 Ultimately, Harknett argues that denial does not influence the decision 
calculus of the enemy by failing to threaten what the attacker covets, nor change their 
behavior from aggressive to non-aggressive.
27
 This is the case even if the attacker’s 
objectives are more difficult to achieve due to the denial strategies in place. Harknett’s 
assertions are echoed by other cyber security scholars who believe that punishment 
should trump denial in an attempt to establish a formal deterrence strategy. For example, 
Arquilla argues: 
“the prospect of warding off a bloody fight by the non-lethal means of disrupting 
military command and control via cyberspace weapons is one that should not be 
passed over easily.”28 
 
While Morgan asserted that punitive deterrence is difficult to implement, Harknett 
argues that objective denial lacks the influential factor necessary to change an attacker’s 
behavior. Separately these strategies are flawed and can be circumvented by those meant 
to be deterred. However, if combined, the two strategies can mitigate the weaknesses of 
the other and successfully influence the decision calculus of an attacker. The idea of 
combining the two strategies emerged in 2003 during the George W. Bush administration 
when cyber deterrence was addressed as a priority national security concern. In 2003, the 
Bush administration published the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), a 
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document released by the White House acknowledging the difficulties in creating cyber 
deterrence and recommending a combined approach that focused on objective denial and 
the use of retaliation in the event of a cyber-attack.  These recommendations were also 
echoed within the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002/2007) and the U.S. 
National Security Strategy (2002/2006). Despite the attention given towards establishing 
a national cyber deterrence strategy, the Bush administration failed to actually create a 
comprehensive framework. Cyber security scholars conclude that the U.S. must deter its 
enemies, not dissuade them, by force if necessary. This strategy became the foundation 
for the Obama administration’s approach to cyber deterrence. 29 
The Obama Strategy (2009-Present) 
This new consensus achieved by cyber experts has pushed cyber deterrence in the 
direction of punitive deterrence. This direction has ensured that a degree of deterrence 
can be established as deterrence through punishment offered the United States the ability 
to threaten and attack what their enemies hold dear in response to a cyber-attack. With 
the stage set for the establishment of a formal cyber deterrence strategy, the Obama 
administration began to work on a comprehensive framework through the Cyberspace 
Policy Review released by the White House in 2009. In this 2009 review, the White 
House stresses the need for a forthcoming cyber deterrence policy needed to safeguard 
critical infrastructure. Harknett’s analysis of the Cyberspace Policy Review goes on to 
say that the U.S. strategic option should be replaced by a war-fighting posture with the 
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mission to respond to cyber aggression.
30
 Two years later, the Obama administration 
released the International Strategy for Cyberspace reflecting Harknett’s ideas (2011). 
In the International Strategy for Cyberspace, it can be seen that the White House 
had paid close attention to the history of American cyber deterrence, clearly separating 
dissuasion from their definition of cyber deterrence. In the section pertaining to 
dissuasion, the White House proposes two approaches designed to make the United 
States more robust to attack and dissuade enemies from attacking through cyberspace. 
One approach focuses on risk mitigation and response through improving network 
security and reducing vulnerabilities. The second approach focuses on international 
collaboration and improving detection for vulnerable national assets and infrastructure 
such as the Bulk Electric System. However, the White House adopted the position of the 
subject-matter experts in cyber deterrence by relegating robustness and resiliency as a 
tactic of dissuasion. Instead, the White House recognized the need to send a costly signal 
to its enemies abroad by targeting what their enemies cherish; their desire to avoid a 
direct conflict with the United States. As such, the White House proposed a deterrence 
strategy that echoed an offensive approach.
 31
 
According to the International Strategy for Cyberspace, the U.S. reserves the right 
to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute any attacker attempting to intrude upon domestic 
and international networks. Furthermore, the strategy also states that the United States 
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shall respond to any hostile acts towards the United States in cyberspace through any and 
all necessary means. This includes diplomatic, economic, informational, and military or 
conventional capabilities. However, the document also claims that any response shall be 
appropriate and consistent with applicable international law. As previously said, this is 
the closest that the United States has ever reached to creating a comprehensive cyber 
deterrence strategy, but nonetheless it is not a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy. 
As with much of the U.S. government’s approaches to dealing with defense related 
issues, the White House took an evasive approach to outline its strategies for the sake of 
operational security, thereby leaving doubt of any clear strategy to deter cyber-
attackers.
32
 
The Realities of U.S. Cyber Deterrence 
According to the White House and the Defense Department, the United States 
will retaliate in kind as applicable within international law in the event of a cyber-attack 
against it. Despite this strong overt signal for retaliation, the United States continues to be 
attacked on a daily basis by state and non-state actors. What is remarkable is the fact that 
there haven’t been any overt responses to punish enemies and signal to others the same 
costs of waging a cyber-attack publically. If the threat of punishment as discussed 
through the history of U.S. cyber Deterrence is designed to deter cyber-attackers, why 
haven’t their decision calculus changed? Attacks continue to occur against critical 
infrastructure and networks such as the BES, Wall Street, and the Pentagon’s SIPRNet on 
a daily basis. Countries have now begun to create units within their state militaries 
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designated to conduct cyber warfare, defense, and espionage. Criminal syndicates and 
hackvitist groups continue to roam free across the world and cyberspace while targeting 
America’s private sector and causing billions of dollars in damages every year. It is clear 
that deterrence is not working, but the question remains as to why deterrence has failed. 
Is the lack of overt retribution the real cause? Is it the lack of a domestic precedent 
similar to the Stuxnet attack in Iran? Mitigating the failures of U.S. cyber deterrence will 
require a reexamination of what deterrence truly is and how it can be applied to 
cyberspace.  
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Chapter 3: Defining U.S. Cyber Deterrence 
In examining the current U.S. cyber-deterrence strategy, this thesis concluded that 
the current strategy is ineffective for a number of reasons. First, the fact that the United 
States is attacked in cyberspace on a daily basis by rival state and non-state actors 
through cyberspace indicates the current strategy is not working (i.e. deterrence is not 
effective in preventing attacks). Second, for the United States to respond against an 
attacker indicates that deterrence has not been achieved. Based on these assumptions, 
where did the current strategy go wrong? 
The nature of cyber-attacks against the United States indicates that deterrence is 
not something that can just be suddenly established between two parties since these 
attacks are on-going. Instead, deterrence must be achieved both horizontally and 
vertically against state and non-state actors. Re-establishing a new USCDS will require 
the United States to persuade its enemies that it is in their benefit to cease all cyber-
attacks. The first step is establishing a deterrent that will emphasize the cost of an attack 
is greater than any benefit. This will change the enemy’s behavior from one of aggression 
to that of being deterred. Once cyber-attackers have ceased, the second step is to ensure 
that cyber-attackers will not revert back to their aggressive behavior and resume 
hostilities. Thus, cyber-deterrence, identical to conventional deterrence, requires the 
United States to modify the enemy’s behavior to preserve a balance of power and avoid 
conflict. If the current strategy does not fit the operational definition of cyber deterrence 
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then what should an alternative strategy look like?  To answer this question, we must first 
review what deterrence is and how it can be achieved in cyberspace. 
Deterrence According to Robert Art 
Robert Art, one of the most influential Cold War scholars, saw deterrence as a 
means to prevent an enemy from behaving in an undesirable fashion. To influence this 
behavior to reflect the interests of the state, Art argued in his famous article To What End 
Military Power that punishment is the only means to maintain enemy behavior once it has 
initially been deterred. In essence, deterrence is the threat of retaliation, a central theme 
within the present Obama Administration’s strategy for cyber deterrence. The key behind 
successfully deterring the enemy is to convince the adversary that the target has the will 
and means to punish the would-be attacker. Art argues that such a strategy is peaceful in 
nature, as it does not involve kinetic action but rather the threat of it. Should the threat be 
carried out, or if the threat fails to deter the enemy, then deterrence has failed. Therefore, 
the threat is made with the intent that it not be carried out, but the quality of the threat is 
dependent on the perception of would-be attackers that the threat of punishment is 
credible. The threat alone is meant to deter action for fear of the consequences. Ironically, 
the success of deterrence can only be judged successful if there is no attack that requires 
the use of retaliation or the use of the deterrent.
33
   
In addition to deterrence, Art also argues that the decision calculus of the enemy 
can be influenced by a strong defensive posture, Art argues the defensive use of force is 
used to mitigate or prevent attacks from occurring by denying the objectives of the 
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enemy. This can be used prior to an attack in the form of a pre-emptive or preventative 
strike, or after an attack has occurred through second strike capabilities. In the latter, a 
second strike is only possible if the attack can be absorbed and the state is resilient 
enough to mobilize its forces for a retaliatory attack. In short, this strategy argues that 
“the best defense is a good offense.” Art emphasizes a clear difference between the 
strategies of defense and deterrence, but his characteristics of the two prove that they can 
be complimentary. On the one hand, Art argues that defensive strategies are characterized 
by defensive preparations and their dissuasive value. On the other hand, deterrence is 
characterized by altering the enemy’s behavior through any means necessary. Therefore, 
a defensive type of force can be operationalized in a manner to change enemy behavior. 
Following this logic, a defensive strategy involves aggressive militarization and 
preparation. Increasing the state’s resiliency through a defensive posture increases its 
ability to absorb an attack from the enemy. When this is realized by the enemy, the 
objectives of the attacker have been denied due to the fact that there is no incentive to 
waste resources on an attack that will not yield any benefit and possibly lead to the 
identity of the aggressor. Furthermore, the defensive posture made possible by a robust 
defensive strategy increases second strike capabilities if there is a need to use them. This 
second strike capability is a strong deterrent and can greatly influence the decision 
calculus of the enemy to change its attacking nature when it remains as a useable option 
by the target state.
34
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Without a defensive strategy, an attacker can easily destabilize a target’s second-
strike capabilities if it knows where to look. The fact that a defensive posture increases 
the survivability of a second-strike makes punishment as a component for denial more 
credible. Meanwhile, the U.S. does not need to be concerned with its punitive capabilities 
when it can ensure that they will still be operational when retaliation is necessary. Thus, 
the combination of a defense posture with a punitive element can serve as a strong 
foundation for an over-arching deterrence framework where a punishment is not 
interchangeable with denial, but merely a part of it. 
Deterrence According to Robert Pape 
In the influential book Bombing to Win, Robert Pape offers an understanding of 
achieving deterrence and coercion through the use of strategic air power. Before 
clarifying what deterrence actually looks like, Pape makes a distinction between coercing 
an enemy and deterring it altogether. Both concepts focus on influencing the enemy’s 
decision-making calculus, but only coercion forces the opponent to change its behavior. 
Deterrence, on the other hand, aims to preserve the status quo by discouraging the enemy 
from altering its behavior in a way that may threaten the balance of power. In the case of 
U.S. cyber security, deterrence is achieved when the enemy is not launching waves of 
cyber-attacks against critical American infrastructure. Coercion, nevertheless, is achieved 
when the enemy is forced to change its behavior and cease its cyber-attacks. Both 
strategies may seem similar, but threats that deter do not necessarily coerce and vice 
versa. According to Pape, the reason behind the disparity is due to the defender’s greater 
affinity for their territory than the attacker, and thus the defender will go to greater 
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lengths to preserve it. Since the attacker is more likely to disturb the status quo and be 
more risk-averse than the defender, defenders are more willing to preserve their territory 
than attackers are willing to take it. As a result, defenders are more likely to deter 
attackers as a result of their greater threshold for suffering.
35
 
To preserve the balance that Pape identified as the foundation for deterrence, 
states can utilize two different approaches. The first approach is through the use of 
punishment, in which the state seeks to inflict costs greater than the benefits gained by 
the attacker. This is basically the USCDS of the Obama Administration discussed in 
Chapter 2, in which the United States increases the costs of attack through the promise of 
retaliation. The second approach is the use of objective denial as the primary alternative 
to cyber deterrence through punishment. Pape argues that the most effective manner to 
deter a conventional enemy is through objective denial as opposed to punishment. 
Punishment, according to Pape, is only effective in instances where nuclear weapons are 
a military factor. In non-nuclear environments, denial is viewed as the prime strategy. 
Denial is achieved when the target or the attacker is undermined to the point where it 
begins to doubt its own strategy. In cyberspace, however, denial is not interchangeable 
with deterrence but merely a form of it.
36
  
Deterrence According to the U.S. Military 
 Similar to Art and Pape, the U.S. Department of Defense has defined deterrence 
as the “prevention from action by fear of the consequences.” The definition outlined by 
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Joint Publication 1-02 in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms goes on to say that “deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the 
existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.” Based on this definition, 
there are two factors that serve as the foundation for deterrence. The first is the creation 
of a credible threat, whether in the form of kinetic capabilities or the ability to deny the 
enemy’s objectives. The second is the ability to carry out the credible threat with 
available resources. Deterrence is only successful when the state is able to convince the 
attacker that the perceived risks to the attacker are greater than the possible benefits and 
the consequences are inevitable. This is achieved when a costly signal of retaliation is 
sent to possible attackers weighing the decision to attack. However, deterrence fails when 
the credible threat is unable to prevent the attack from occurring. Ultimately, the aim for 
the United States is to be able to influence the enemy’s behavior through a psychological 
effect created by a clear response protocol.
37
 
Deterrence in Cyberspace 
With the definition of deterrence clearly identified, the next question to answer is 
whether deterrence can effectively center the U.S. cyberspace strategy. Additionally, the 
question must be asked whether deterrence through punishment is more or less effective 
than objective denial and a strong defensive posture. Chapter 3 will now discuss what an 
effective USCDS must look like and whether punishment, denial, or a balance of the two 
is the best strategy to implement for a new U.S. cyber  deterrence strategy.  
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What is Cyber Deterrence? 
However, what of those who do not fear retaliation or who work within borders of 
a state willing to protect them? Similar to the concept of classical deterrence, Richard 
Andres argues that cyber-attackers must be convinced that the costs of an attack are far 
greater than any derived benefits. Like deterrence in the physical world, this is achieved 
by denying the attacker’s objectives and preserving the threat of retaliation. Based on 
Andres’ depiction of deterrence in cyberspace, combining denial and punishment can 
make deterrence viable in the digital world just as it is in the physical world. However, in 
order to achieve cyber deterrence, both denial and punishment strategies must overcome 
eight evaluative criteria affecting cyber deterrence.
38
 
The Attribution Problem 
Like any crime committed by one actor against another, the target can only 
respond against the attacker if it can successfully attribute the attack. Attribution in the 
physical world can be an issue when attacks are unclaimed or committed on a small-
scale. Regardless, it is clear that a physical attack taken against a target that a perpetrator 
would be identified over time. In cyberspace, it is much easier for attackers to conceal 
their identities and origins.
39
 This anonymity makes attribution difficult to achieve given 
the number of forms an attacker can take. For example, an attacker can be a state actor or 
an element of a national government with authorization to use cyber-attacks against a 
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rival state, such as the Chinese hacking group APT1.
40
 APT1, also known as Unit 61398 
of the People’s Liberation Army of China, has been attributed in a series of attacks on 
U.S. critical infrastructure and media outlets.
41
 However, attribution was not achieved 
until February 2013 despite hundreds of data breaches.  
A state does not need to use its military capabilities for it to be implicated in a 
cyber-attack. A state-sponsored cyber-attacker can be a single perpetrator or a group of 
freelance hackers supported by a national entity thus a state can maintain deniability.
 
An 
attacker can also be a rogue element seeking to undermine their government for political 
or nationalist reasons. Non-state cyber-attackers can also emerge in multiple forms. An 
attacker can be a criminal enterprise seeking to profit from the destruction of U.S. critical 
infrastructure. They can also include fundamentalists, terrorists, or hacktivists waging a 
cyber-attack in the name of an ideology. Finally, an attack can originate from a single 
hacker contracted by any of the entities discussed above. It is also possible for attackers 
to disguise their true identities by masquerading as another state or non-state actor. Given 
the wide range of possible attackers, having the tools to successfully attribute an attack is 
necessary for the ability to retaliate.
 42
   
The Contestability Problem 
Even if targets can successfully identify their attacker, they must be able to prove 
to the international community the attack is definitive enough to merit retaliation. An 
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accusation is only worth making when there is enough evidence to incriminate the 
perpetrator without question and fully justify the action.
 
The lack of evidence grants the 
perpetrator the opportunity to contest the accusation of attack without incurring 
punishment from the target, as the target risks losing its social capital if it responds while 
uncertainty regarding the identity of the perpetrator remain. Compiling credible evidence 
is vital as it signals to the world the perpetrator’s acknowledgment in its role in the attack 
rather than it just being accused by the target. Thus, contestability is another criterion for 
the establishment of a deterrence strategy. Limitations in attribution can also impact 
contestability and weaken the effectiveness of the deterrent. Without clearly identifying 
the attack, a target is unable to weaken the enemy’s contestability and lead to further 
attacks from state and non-state actors who can circumvent a target’s forensic 
capabilities.
 43
 
The Code of Silence Problem 
To successfully persuade a rival to maintain its deterred behavior, this requires 
overt and costly signals. Without overt signals, potential attackers are completely 
uncertain if there is a protocol for retaliation, causing an increase in cyber-attacks. 
Governments and companies compound the issue given the desire to keep offensive and 
defensive successes a secret in order to preserve their effectiveness. When capabilities are 
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revealed, attackers and defenders alike will discover ways to exploit their opponent’s 
vulnerabilities. Revealing the extent of a cyber-attack can also have disastrous political 
and economic consequences. Private companies who are overtly attacked will lose the 
confidence of their clients and shareholders. OBES who have SCADA systems 
manipulated by a cyber-attacker find themselves scrutinized by lawmakers and are forced 
to implement costly reforms. Even when the intelligence community or the military 
becomes the victim of a cyber-attack, such as the penetration of the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s classified SIPRNet, it causes a loss in credibility with stakeholders. With this 
in mind, both public and private organizations have an incentive to act evasively 
regarding cyber-attacks for political, economic, and security reasons. This results in the 
lack of developing new and effective means to combat cyber-attackers in the future. 
Furthermore, an overt deterrence strategy similar to the one used for nuclear weapons and 
mutually assured destruction during the Cold War is difficult to achieve due to the 
inability to send cyber-attackers a costly signal of retribution.
44
 
The Regulation Problem 
Much of the critical infrastructure in the United States is owned and operated by 
the private sector. As such, defending these vulnerable industries is difficult to do without 
developing a public-private partnership. In some cases, Andres argues, government 
regulation is an option to improve the protection of critical infrastructure made vulnerable 
by cyber-attacks. Regulations such as improving detection standards or mandating the use 
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of isolated intranet systems can provide a significant advantage to the defense of 
infrastructure. However, to do so will result in the imposition of great economic costs that 
owners of U.S. critical infrastructure consistently lobby against. With the private sector 
unwilling to pay the costs to effectively protect vital industries, deterrence suddenly lacks 
credibility given the lax security of critical infrastructure. The degradation or destruction 
of such infrastructure can cause severe implications for the American population and 
weaken the second-strike capabilities of the United States by reducing its flexibility for 
response. Therefore, it is difficult to deter a cyber-attack when it can eliminate second-
strike capabilities by targeting specific critical infrastructure, such as the Bulk Electric 
System.
45
  
The Spy-VS-Treaty Problem 
When a state is lucky enough to successfully attribute a cyber-attack, it must track 
the location of its attacker in order to neutralize the threat. Should the attacker be located 
across state borders, the target must rely on international agreements designed to track 
and prosecute the attacker for their crimes. This is typically a non-issue when countries 
cooperate jointly in the tracking and attribution of cyber-attacker. For example, the 
United States can respond against a non-state actor in an allied state with extradition 
laws. This becomes an issue when the attacker is located in a country that is unwilling to 
cooperate or is complicit in the aggression. For example, the Estonian cyber incident in 
2007 illustrates the concept of vigilante hackers hiding behind a state actor. In this 
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instance, Russian hackers attacked Estonian cyberspace in response to a diplomatic 
incident between Russia and Estonia. When the attacks were traced to IP addresses in the 
Russian Federation, Estonia’s retaliation was stalled in part because of unwillingness by 
Russia to punish their own citizens or grant Estonian investigators access to Russian 
cyberspace. If Russia had cooperated with Estonia, it would have left it vulnerable to 
Estonia investigating the attack and possibly implicating the Russian government in the 
cyber-attack. Due to Russia’s uncooperative nature, Estonia was unable to conduct the 
forensic analysis it needed to attribute its attack and justify its retaliation. Russia, like 
many other havens for cyber-attackers, will continue to pose a threat to the viability of 
punitive deterrence strategies to deter non-state actors.
46
  
The Scalability Problem 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the void of regulation in cyberspace makes the concept 
of using social norms to influence behavior unattainable. This also applies to creating 
norms to address the issues of crime, espionage, terrorism, and warfare in cyberspace. 
The lack of established norms creates an issue regarding proportionate behavior in 
response to a cyber-attack. Small attacks with little damage usually do not merit 
retaliation, but if the United States chooses to respond against insignificant attacks with 
large-scale capabilities, it runs the risk of waging a disproportionate response.
47
 Many 
states have tried to establish what is considered to be a cybercrime distinguishable from 
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espionage, terrorism, and warfare. Others, like the United States, reserve the right to use 
any and all means necessary to address a cyber-attack on a U.S. system. This disparity 
creates a scalability issue for the United States and other potential targets of cyber-
attacks. Does a cyber-attack on Wall Street that causes billions of dollars’ worth in 
damage merit the same punitive response as a rocket attack on American military 
instillations? The latter example would be considered an act of war whereas the former 
continues to occur undeterred and without an overt response from the US. In the event 
that a cyber-attack on Wall Street does merit a response, to what extent can the United 
States respond?  
The main issue regarding the scalability problem is due to its unpredictable effects 
vis-à-vis conventional weaponry. For example, a tank, nuclear weapon, or even a soldier 
on the front line can have a predicted effect on the battlefield. On the other hand, a cyber-
attack can have widespread intended and unintended consequences. In the case of the 
Russo-Georgian War of 2008, Russian hackers intentionally defaced Georgian websites 
and temporarily crippled electronic services in Georgian cyberspace. Russian hackers 
also implemented time-sensitive viruses that wreaked havoc upon Georgia’s cyberspace 
for weeks after the physical war had subsided. Building a deterrence strategy in 
cyberspace without clear social norms is difficult. The ambiguous properties of 
scalability can embolden attackers to use their cyber capabilities with minimal fear of 
retaliation given the target’s fear of inciting retribution and escalating the conflict.48 
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Socio-Political and Economic Costs 
Warfare is expensive as is the militarization required to prepare for it. The costs 
associated with attacking enemies, whether in the natural or cyber world, is a 
considerable factor that can serve as an obstacle to deterrence as well as the costs 
associated with defense. Reduced public sector budgets can limit the options available to 
retaliate against a cyber-attack. In regards to building defense for critical infrastructure, 
much of the financial responsibility is held by private-sector operators. Private companies 
will not bolster their resiliency without some form of incentive for offsetting the cost. 
These financial limitations can be exacerbated by strenuous economic conditions that 
constrain the spending capabilities of public and private sector entities, further increasing 
the challenge of establishing deterrence with constrained capabilities. Nevertheless, the 
threat of physical retaliation is likely to be more cost effective than increasing the 
resiliency of critical infrastructure and networks in the United States. This is because 
physical or electronic retaliation is less expensive than bolstering defenses for critical 
infrastructure.
49
 
Despite the economic limitations associated with deterrence, socio-political costs 
that exist. Again, failing to deter an enemy can have consequences against the target 
population, resulting in grave implications that can threaten financial security, social 
order, and the lives of civilians. Addressing socio-political costs serves as an additional 
criterion for the creation of a cyber-deterrence strategy. As such, a national framework 
for cyber deterrence must also incorporate a contingency plan in the event of its failure. 
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Without such plans, socio-political costs can mount and threaten the ability of the target 
to recover. In addition, cyber-attackers will be emboldened to carry out further strikes as 
the weakened target is pre-occupied with mitigating the damaged incurred from the initial 
attack. 
An Alternative Strategy to Punishment: Robustness 
With a firm understanding of the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of 
cyber deterrence, an alternative USCDS must be created to avoid the problems associated 
with deterrence via punishment. Policymakers should reintroduce the concept of 
objective denial to be used as the center of a new USCDS. In contrast, past scholars have 
dismissed objective denial as a dissuasion tactic and nothing more which has been echoed 
by the Obama Administration. However, when objective denial takes the form of the 
defensive use of force, the ability to absorb attacks increases the likelihood of deterrence. 
As such, defense-in-depth strategies based on denying the aggressors’ goals can be used 
as an alternative deterrence strategy to address the eight criteria impacting the 
effectiveness of cyber deterrence. A deterrence framework based on denial also addresses 
the realities of cyber security. It is based on the assumption that not all attacks can be 
prevented and defensive capabilities cannot evolve as quickly as offensive capabilities. 
The question remains, however, what would a U.S. strategy based on objective denial 
look like for cyber deterrence?
50
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To achieve deterrence in cyberspace requires the acceptance that deterrence does 
not solely depend on a target’s obligation to retaliate.51 Threatening to punish a cyber-
attacker into compliance is ineffective. Rather than threatening to punish would-be 
attackers, the United States would be better served to prevent attackers from meeting 
their objectives through an array of capabilities. As discussed previously, denial as used 
here is not a substitute for deterrence but rather a form of it. One way to achieve 
deterrence is through the implementation of a strategy centered on establishing 
robustness. Robustness is a three-pronged denial strategy that consists of defense, 
redundancy, and the preservation of the option for retaliation. 
Defense-in-Depth 
In 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Task Force (CIFT) of the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council (HSAC) argued that critical infrastructure protection measures were: 
“focused too much on protecting assets from terrorist attacks and not focused enough on 
improving the resilience of assets against a variety of threats.”52 Denying the enemy’s 
objectives in cyberspace will require the United States to combine mainstream notions of 
U.S. cyber security with unconventional approaches for cyber resilience. To 
operationalize this union, the United States must implement a cyber-strategy that includes 
a strong defense-in-depth component. In the military sense, defense-in-depth is best 
illustrated through the metaphor of a medieval castle and its defense against invaders.  
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A castle consists of multiple layers of defense designed to provide contingencies 
in the event of the failure of any single defensive layers.
 
The multiple layers ensure that 
the enemy will have to devote much of its resources to get to reach the castle’s inner 
sanctum and claim whatever prize the castle is defending. To reach the prize, the invaders 
will be forced to encounter the first line of defense consisting of a barrage of arrows fired 
by archers on the castle walls. Next, the invaders must cross the moat surrounding the 
castle since the drawbridge has been raised. Once the invaders reach the outer wall, they 
must scale it, tunnel under it, or blow a hole in it to cross the barrier. However, crossing 
the outer wall only leads the invaders to cross the gap to the inner wall laden with traps 
and defending soldiers. Even if the invaders make it to the inner wall, they are uncertain 
of the challenges that lie ahead under the harassment of the defenders. There can be 
additional walls, traps, soldiers, and even the keep at the very center. Demoralized from 
the challenges that lie ahead, attackers are faced with the decision to press on or retreat to 
the safety of their encampment. If the attackers retreat, the defenders have successfully 
denied the objectives of the enemy by trading space for time, protecting the key resources 
within, and retaining control of the environment.
 53
  
Not only is defense-in-depth a formidable strategy for warfare, but it can be a 
powerful component for a denial-based U.S. deterrence strategy. Like the castle 
metaphor, the United States must increase its resilience of its systems by implementing 
multiple layers of physical and cyber defenses. Bolstering preventive and detection 
capabilities increases the difficulty and reduces the effectiveness of a cyber-attack. This 
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is due to the increased likelihood of a cyber-attacker getting caught in the act, the 
possibility of preventing the attack from reaching its target, and the increased likelihood 
of identification or retaliation. Creating multiple defensive barriers mirrors the use of 
defense-in-depth in a conventional sense by trading cyberspace for time. As time elapses, 
the target can improve its chances to attribute the attack and force the disclosure of intent 
by the attacker while also denying the aggressor’s goals for the attack. An added benefit 
of the defense-in-depth strategy is that once disclosure has been achieved, the target can 
scale its response appropriately with minimal risk for escalation and retaliation from 
another state. Although the use of a defense-in-depth framework can have the potential to 
change an attacker’s behavior, it alone cannot do so due to the realities of cyber security 
discussed in Chapter 1. With this in mind, the United States must accept that attacks will 
circumvent the defensive layers proposed above. As a result, the key to denying the 
enemy and rendering attacks ineffective is to ensure a layered defense is resilient enough 
to absorb an attack.
54
 
Redundancy 
Making a system more robust will also require making the system as a whole as 
redundant as possible. Redundancy allows the target to absorb any attack upon the system 
while minimizing its effects. Thus, if defenses are breached, redundancy minimizes the 
consequences and may even deny the attacker the effects they hope to achieve while 
preserving the second-strike capabilities. An illustration of the advantages of redundancy 
can be seen in the engineering of airplanes. The aviation industry implements a redundant 
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approach for security in order to preserve the integrity of airplanes.
55
 Airplanes are 
designed to reflect a set of small, diverse, and coordinating functions.
56
 Each system 
takes into account the implications of a system failure on other systems.
57
 Multiple 
redundancies are incorporated within the system to mitigate failures and ensure 
survivability.
58
 The extent of redundancy in aviation is detailed in Appendix H of the 
FAA System Safety Handbook:  
“For safety critical command and control functions: a system design that requires 
at least three independent failures, or three independent human errors, or a  
combination of three independent failures and human errors.”  
 
A similar approach must be implemented to protect critical infrastructure in the 
United States. If there are Chinese cyber-attacks on the electric grid or on American 
financial institutions that go undetected, U.S. systems must be able to absorb the attack 
and isolate damage. Like in the aviation industry, the U.S. critical infrastructure must be 
able to withstand system failures and quarantine infected areas while preventing the total 
collapse of the system. The U.S. will be able to absorb attacks while sending a powerful 
signal to cyber-attackers that their objectives have been denied. 
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The Option of a Tailored Response 
In addition to denying the enemy’s objectives, physical and network redundancy 
in critical infrastructure will preserve the U.S. ability to retaliate and enhance its deterrent 
with the threat of punishment. Cyber-attacks against the U.S. will be mitigated, ensuring 
the survival of second-strike measures, whether physical or through cyberspace. This 
fosters the opportunity for a tailored response, where punishment is merely an option 
based on the scale of the attack and the survival of second-strike capabilities. Robustness 
allows the U.S. the time, resources, and capabilities to absorb and analyze an attack in 
order to identify the perpetrator and plan its response. Rather than immediately 
responding, as argued in the current strategy, the U.S. can tailor responses to be executed 
at the most advantageous moment. Specifically tailoring responses based on information 
collected through defense-in-depth and redundancy measures permits the U.S. to address 
its cyber deterrence criteria. Finally, the objective denial made possible by layered 
defenses and redundancy in conjunction with the threat of tailored retaliation allows the 
United States to effectively deter cyber-attackers contemplating a strike against the 
United States. 
Conclusion 
In this proposed strategy of U.S. cyber deterrence for robustness Chapter 3 has 
identified the benefits of substituting a purely punitive approach to deterrence with an 
alternative based on robustness; confronting would-be attackers with both meaningful 
and frustrating defense in depth and objective denying redundancy. Rather than punishing 
cyber-attackers, the United States can place itself in a position to absorb attacks through a 
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layered defense. The greater the defensive posture, the lower the probability that a cyber-
attack will be effective.
59
 Additionally, a layered defense will safeguard the United 
States’ second strike capabilities and permit a tailored response if needed. However, the 
question remains as to how robustness can be implemented as a cyber-deterrence 
strategy. What would it look like to a cyber-attacker seeking to strike at critical 
infrastructure? Chapter 4 will illustrate how robustness can be used to safeguard the Bulk 
Electric System and deter potential cyber-attackers. 
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Chapter 4: Applying Robustness to the Bulk Electric System 
As discussed in Chapter 2, thousands of cyber-attacks occur daily against the 
United States confirming that the current strategy is unsuccessful. Chapter 3 identified 
factors that determine the effectiveness of cyber deterrence and offered a new USCDS 
based on denying enemy objectives. Chapter 4 will illustrate how this new cyber strategy 
based on denial deterrence will be implemented using the Bulk Electric System (BES) as 
an example to deter cyber-attackers. 
A cyber-attack against the electric grid is designed to gather information, destroy 
infrastructure, disrupt energy services, or a combination of the three. Thus, increasing 
resiliency requires an electronic and physical approach to security. Once operators of the 
OBES are robust both in cyberspace and the physical world, these firms can withstand 
any attempts to undermine the BES. When a cyber-attacker is denied the opportunity to 
achieve its objectives to disrupt the BES, they will be deterred realizing that they are 
wasting resources on objectives that cannot be met. As a result, some attackers will seek 
to exploit or attack another target that is more impuissant than the one denying their 
objectives and draining their resources. Other attackers will simply quit after realizing 
that their goals are unattainable. The critical factor in changing the enemy’s behavior is to 
signal resiliency through the adoption of robustness as a USCDS. Doing so will mitigate 
attacks on the BES and other critical infrastructure while denying cyber-attackers the 
motivation to strike.
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Achieving robustness in the electric grid requires a multi-phased defense-in-depth 
strategy designed to absorb cyber-attacks and increase the ability for attribution. In 
regards to the BES, robustness will incorporate both physical and cyber security 
measures to better protect grid components. Such measures include securing both the 
physical and digital perimeter of the electric grid, protecting data and services, and 
increasing redundancy. Maximizing the effects of robust deterrence can only be achieved 
by implementing all three components of this USCDS for the electric grid. This ensures 
the ability for the grid to absorb and mitigate cyber-attacks while simultaneously 
gathering information for attribution purposes and optional retaliation.
60
  
Phase I: Layered Defenses 
Protecting the electric grid from malicious cyber-attackers begins at the security 
perimeter of each SCADA system and its connected infrastructure. The first phase of 
robustness in the BES involves a mixture of detection and prevention measures. As noted 
in Overman utility defense in depth model, boundary protection measures such as 
physically securing electrical transmission and setting traps to lure cyber-attackers is the 
first-line of defense for the BES. Other layers of defense include designing safeguards to 
protect services and data of the OBES from physical and electronic intrusion from 
external and internal forces, this includes the idea of an internal threat is critical to 
ensuring the reliability of the BES.
61
  
 
                                                             
60 Ibid. 
61 Overman. “High-Assurance Smart Grid.”  
 
 
48 
 
Perimeter Security 
Among the most vulnerable components of the electric grids are remote terminal 
units (RTU). RTUs can easily be accessed since there is little security in place to protect 
them from external tampering. For example, the Smart Grid and its Smart Meters have 
emerged as a innovate means to increase the efficiency in the electric grids. Meters are 
connected remotely to SCADA systems to allow home owners to control and monitor 
their energy usage. Smart Meters are typically located along the outside walls of private 
homes, and are typically encased within a metal box and secured with a padlock. For 
cyber-attackers unwilling to infiltrate the Smart Meter remotely, they can easily access 
the meter by simply removing the lock. Once the attacker has gained access to the meter, 
it can easily manipulate the system to attack the private home owner or establish a 
connection with the regional SCADA system to strike from within the system. Likewise, 
RTUs in remote areas are just as insecure as Smart Meters. Despite the lack of densely 
populated areas, RTUs are still vulnerable to cyber-attackers willing to seek out and 
exploit units in rural areas. These units are typically defenseless or are defended by a 
fence and a padlock. Therefore, this first line of defense is physically vulnerable and 
needs to be secured from unauthorized physical or remote access.
62
 
Studying Cyber-Attacks in Real-Time 
Another way to defend the proximity of the electric grid from cyber-attacks is to 
establish traps known as a Honeypot. This trap is designed to detect, deflect, study, and in 
certain cases counter cyber-attacks upon information systems. Honeypots can emerge in 
                                                             
62 U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System. 
 
 
49 
 
many different forms, but function with the same purpose. The use of a Honeypot will 
allow the U.S. to partner OBES to forensically analyze captured malware used by cyber-
attackers on the electric grid. OBES typically utilize production Honeypots which gather 
limited data on malware detected in the company network. These Honeypots are limited 
in their ability to gather information about attackers to successfully attribute an attack to a 
single or group of attackers. In contrast, research Honeypots allow for closer monitoring 
of attackers and attacks and are typically used by research, government, and U.S. military 
organizations. Research Honeypots come in two forms: high-interaction and low-
interaction Honeypots. High-interaction Honeypots create a virtual system identical to the 
actual system being targeted. The virtual system is used as a decoy to lure attackers into 
wasting their resources on infecting and destroying the expendable trap as well as 
possibly exposing their identity. Low-interaction Honeypots replicate the most targeted 
services within the system and require fewer resources than a high-interaction Honeypot 
that attempts to simulate the entire system.  Nevertheless, OBES would be better served 
to gather as much information as possible to learn about attacker’s signatures and 
methodology. This is easily achieved through the use of research Honeypots, which 
hardens the first line of defense against cyber-attackers weighing the risk of being 
identified through time and resource expenditures.  A Honeypot in the electric grid would 
essentially replicate the system controls of a SCADA or even a specific power node. The 
cyber-attacker seeking to undermine the system would release their malware on the trap, 
unaware that they are being monitored; cyber-attackers will continue to expend their 
resources in the attack and leave a larger forensic footprint. As a result, OBES can collect 
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more data on the attack and share the information with public sector stakeholders of the 
BERS, leading to the cooperation of these entities for research, attribution, and response 
purposes.
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Controlling Unauthorized Electronic Access 
As previously outlined, Smart Meters are an easy target for malicious attackers to 
exploit due to their physical and remote vulnerabilities. Although one can easily break 
apart the metal casing sheltering a Smart Meter on the side of a private residence, it can 
be just as trivial to access the device remotely given its lack of a firewall. Once inside the 
Smart Meter, the malicious attackers can use the device as a conduit to target the private 
residence or direct its attack onto the connected SCADA. This is where electronic 
perimeter security measures are necessary to deny access to critical systems connected to 
the Smart Meter. An example of a measure that should be implemented is a host firewall 
designed to protect device ports and services. Critical systems, such as a SCADA, that 
are secured by host firewalls will be able to control the flow of data packets originating 
from remote terminal units. If an RTU, such as a Smart Meter, is compromised, 
connected systems will be able to block all incoming digital traffic from the corrupted 
unit. The use of host firewalls and other types of prevention software will add another 
layer of security for OBES seeking to deny cyber-attackers remote access to their systems 
from weakly defended units connected to a SCADA or other critical infrastructure.
64
  
                                                             
63 Frederick, Erwin E. Testing A Low-Interaction Honeypot Against Live Cyberattackers. 2011 n.d. 
Accessed March 15, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA552206&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
64 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Cyber Security Division. Recommended Practice: 
Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity With Defense-In-Depth Strategies. 2009. Accessed 
May 1, 2013. http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/practices/documents/Defense_in_Depth_Oct09.pdf. 
 
 
51 
 
Another measure to deny cyber-attackers access to Smart Meters is through 
integrity measures such as Information-Theoretic Confidentiality (ITC). ITC permits 
OBES to prevent cyber-attackers from eavesdropping on private customers by remotely 
accessing their Smart Meter through encoded bits transmitted from the meter. This is 
achieved by reducing the entropy, the loss of information in a transmitted signal, of Smart 
Meters so that cyber-attackers are unable to capture information from the transmitted 
encoded bits. Such integrity measures will increase the difficulty for cyber-attackers to 
penetrate the BES remotely through RTUs, however it may also drive them to seek out 
methods to by-pass the electronic security perimeter altogether.  
A SCADA can be penetrated accidently or with malicious intent without having 
to encounter a firewall. One such way is plugging in a USB flash drive that has been 
accidently or deliberately infected with malware. State and non-state cyber attackers alike 
can download malware onto USB drives to be transferred onto other systems. For 
example, the Stuxnet worm attacked Iranian energy infrastructure and was spread from 
infected computers through USB drives and peer-to-peer sharing. Once a person 
disconnected an infected USB flash drive from an infected computer, they unknowingly 
spread the virus to other computers whenever their flash drive was reconnected. OBES 
can make the same mistake with the BES by bringing their infected flash drives home 
and connecting them to the company network. As such, access controls must not be 
limited into the access and monitoring of personnel, but also to the devices that are 
introduced to a sensitive environment such as a SCADA control room. Thus, a robust 
OBES will have policies prohibiting any and all flash drives and other devices that can 
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either physically or electronically connect to a system.  Flash drives, personal computers, 
smart phones and other devices vulnerable to unauthorized access should be completely 
barred from sensitive areas to ensure maximum internal security.
65
 
Host Hardening 
While external threats are present from cyber-attackers seeking to penetrate the 
BES, threats can also exist from within an operator of the BES. OBES must take proper 
measures to implement internal security measures to protect against disgruntled 
employees or anyone that can gain access to a company’s systems. There have even been 
instances where dismissed employees still had access to critical systems such as a 
SCADA despite no longer being employed by the OBES. With this in mind, OBES 
should implement rigid host hardening procedures as recommended by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and/or Department of Defense (DoD). Host hardening 
procedures are designed to control access to critical systems while reducing their 
vulnerabilities. One of the access control procedures, for instance, disables unused user 
accounts while hardening security settings for required services. This ensures that unused 
services, such as tools, libraries, and files for example, are removed and limits access by 
certain hosts or IP blocks that should no longer have access a system. Disgruntled 
employees who have been forced to leave the company will no longer have access to 
critical SCADA functions from within or without the system. Additionally, OBES should 
install host-based intruder detection systems, thereby adding additional defensive layers 
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for detecting unauthorized access to the system. Implementing such procedures will allow 
OBES to preserve the integrity of data and services while mitigating or preventing 
insidious attacks. Furthermore, updating systems and removing obsolete services will 
serve to improve an operator’s system performance in addition to security.66  
Other Access Control Measures 
It is imperative for n to create multiple layers of defense to increase the likelihood 
of detection and the difficulty of BES penetration. OBES would also benefit by 
safeguarding their data and services from external threats by implementing file integrity 
checking, host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS), and secure network 
management protocols such as SNMPv3 to add additional layers for detection. OBES 
should also consider encrypting their in-transit and rest data, and router authentication 
protocols to curb cyber-attackers once they have penetrated a SCADA or other systems.
67
 
With a consistent threat of attack, OBES must plan for the possibility that a cyber-
attacker can navigate past the layered defenses discussed above. Should an OBES fail to 
detect and prevent an attack from occurring, it must ensure that its system is robust 
enough to absorb the attack and limit damage locally. Mitigating the implications of a 
cyber-attack will require the BES to be redundant enough to ensure continuity in the 
event of attack. 
 
 
                                                             
66 Burns, Bryan, Dave Killion, Nicolas Beauchesne, Eric Moret, Julien Sobrier, Michael Lynn, Eric 
Markham, et al. Security Power Tools, 421-430. Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly, 2007. 
67 Overman. “High-Assurance Smart Grid.” 
 
 
54 
 
Phase II: Redundancy 
 Once cyber-attackers maneuver past an OBES’s layered defenses and begin 
exploiting critical systems, the next step is to attack critical systems to cause immediate 
or long-term BES damage.  The cyber-attacker’s aim is to access critical system that 
transfer electrical currents and shut it down in an attempt to cause a power surge. When a 
power node is destroyed, current power funneled through lines must be re-directed or risk 
creating a surge with the potential to destroy additional nodes and transmission lines. It is 
this secondary nature of this attack, after an initial power node or even the entire SCADA 
system is attacked, which can further damage infrastructure and cause cascading 
blackouts. In a BES with little redundancy, SCADA’s and their supporting infrastructure 
operate in a linear fashion. Command protocols from the generator dictate the energy 
flow from substations to field devices through transmission lines. As illustrated by 
FIGURE 1, energy passes easily from one substation to its corresponding field devices, 
but not horizontally from field device to field device or substation to substation.
68
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     Figure 169 
To prevent this from occurring, an increase of redundancy through the building of 
ancillary power lines is required. When redundancy is established, energy will be able to 
pass horizontally in addition to its linear path. Redistributing the excess load caused by a 
downed power line or node through ancillary lines will divert current to other nodes in 
proximity. This ensures that the energy surge created by a downed transmission line or a 
cyber-attack can be dispersed across the grid to other substations and field devices, as 
illustrated by FIGURE 2. In the event of S1’s failure, energy can flow directly to S2 as 
indicated by the blue lines representing the redundancy created by ancillary lines. Energy 
can then be redistributed across to S3, depending on the capacity of S2, and all of their 
corresponding field devices to ensure that power disruptions can be mitigated. Under this 
example, the power outage caused by the failure of S1 will only result in the failures of 
                                                             
69 Source: figure adopted from Overman, Thomas M., Terry L. Davis, and Ronald W. Sackman. "High 
Assurance Smart Grid." Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information 
Intelligence Research. Last modified 2010. http://0-
delivery.acm.org.bianca.penlib.du.edu/10.1145/1860000/1852734/a61-
overman.pdf?ip=130.253.4.14&id=1852734&acc=ACTIVE%20SERVICE&key=C2716FEBFA981EF1E6
6739E26778C50D1A135E9E0C10ED60&CFID=234176311&CFTOKEN=63291536&__acm__=1374080
167_a9efbb782636cad50c2f401490e3a2b4. 
 
 
56 
 
F1 and F2, while F3 remains operational through the redistribution of power to S2 and 
the ancillary line that connects F3 to the substation.
70
 
 
         Figure 271 
Power nodes rarely operate at full capacity and by spreading out the overload of 
current across the entire grid with interconnecting lines will reduce the probability for a 
large-scale failure of the area’s power system. Blackouts will be limited to the most 
severely struck areas, and outages will be relegated to small isolated areas. For example, 
a downed power line or node can have the potential to cause a city-wide blackout in 
certain areas of the country. Through the robustness strategy, the excess current will be 
redistributed through physical redundancy measures to isolate the blackout to a limited 
area. In this instance, a power outage of city-wide proportions can potentially be limited 
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to a two-block radius. Ultimately, any large-scale cyber-attacks to disrupt energy services 
whether at a local or regional level will be mitigated if proper physical redundancies, 
such as ancillary lines, are in place.
72
 
Another method to promote redundancy in the BES is to reduce the 
interoperability of the grid. Presently, the BES is interconnected so that all segments of 
the electric grid are linked together in both the physical and digital world. This reality 
poses a significant risk in the event of a catastrophic cyber-attack with the potential to 
cause a devastating blackout. As discussed above, a single grid failure has the potential to 
cause a cascading blackout which can spread across the interconnected grid with 
devastating consequences. In 2003, for example, grid failures in Ohio led to a cascading 
blackout that affected the eastern coast of the United States. Citizens from New Jersey to 
the Canadian province of Ontario were plunged into darkness as the surge in power 
spread to connected regional grids and forced power plants to go offline. As opposed to 
building towards an interconnected grid, the United States would be better served to 
begin diversifying the BES to prevent future cascading blackouts. Creating independent 
and distinct micro grids will increase the redundancy of the BES as a whole. Each 
independent grid can have its own unique layered defense system to detect, prevent, and 
absorb attacks. Such layered defenses can be tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of 
the OBES’s systems. Should one of the micro grids be comprised from a cyber-attack, the 
BES as a whole can survive unhindered by cascading blackouts or other severe 
implications. This form of diversity will prevent cyber-attackers from creating 
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interoperable malware that can affect multiple components of the BES using identical 
software, programs, and systems. Additionally, isolating the effects of a cyber-attack to a 
specific area will allow OBES to repair the damage in a timely fashion without factoring 
the connectivity to other sectors of the BES. Implementing this form of redundancy 
provides a cost-effective way for OBES to maintain the integrity of their infrastructure 
while limiting the extent of a cyber-attack. OBES can use available technology, such as 
synchrophasors, to monitor their segments of the grid in isolation. Synchrophasor 
technology grants OBES the capability to monitor in real-time to detect disturbances, 
predict instability, and control the problem. Any intrusion by a cyber-attacker on grid 
infrastructure using synchrophasor technology will cause irregularities noticeable to 
monitors. The technology will grant OBES the ability to better identify and defend 
against cyber-attacks on their isolated systems. Although synchrophasor technology can 
also be targeted and corrupted by cyber-attackers, OBES can mitigate these 
vulnerabilities by randomizing and concentrating synchrophasor data packets used for 
monitoring activities, which will also make the system more redundant. Concentrating 
multiple data packets into a single line of code and inserting dummy packets to 
masquerade as relevant data will keep cyber-attackers guessing and force them to devote 
more resources to successfully corrupt synchrophasor data packets. Creating diversity 
and redundancy through isolated segments of the BES will ensure that no one cyber-
attack can spread across the BES to cause widespread damage at a regional or national 
level. 
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In addition to building ancillary lines or a distributed grid, OBES can strengthen 
their redundancy by working closely with each other and their public sector partners to 
share intelligence. This concept is not new in a sense that it is presently being advocated 
by the Obama Administration through the 2013 Executive Order for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cyberspace. The executive order calls upon a critical infrastructure 
operator (CIO) to coordinate with the public sector to share classified information 
pertaining to the protection of infrastructure. In the case of the BES, OBES can benefit 
greatly by sharing information on cyber-attackers and their capabilities with fellow 
OBES in addition to the public sector.
73
 The notion of information sharing promoted by a 
presidential executive order fosters a sense of network centric warfare first proposed by 
Arthur Cebrowski during the late 1990s. Cebrowski argued that giving planes, ships and 
soldiers to communicate with each other on the battle field rather than transmitting 
messages to a central command can greatly increase force effectiveness in combating an 
enemy.
74
 This idea creates a shared awareness between forces regardless of their location 
in order to synchronize their response to a threat. In the case of building redundancy in 
the BES, synchronizing efforts to address cyber threats builds redundancy as each OBES 
will increase its defense posture to prevent or absorb an attack. Once a cyber-attack has 
been detected whether through synchropashor technology, redundant metering, or other 
forms of redundancy, the targeted OBES can quickly share information gathered with 
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their counter-parts. Other OBES can use the collected intelligence to adjust their defenses 
in anticipation of the attack spreading to their systems. With this in mind, OBES across 
the United States will be on alert and better prepared to defend against future cyber-
attacks, which contributes to the redundancy of the BES should the cyber-attack spread 
from the initial targeted company system.  
Phase III: Tailored Response 
 Once an attack has been launched upon the BES, the United States will find itself 
with the option to respond if necessary. Layered defenses and the redundancy of the 
electric grid will allow OBES to either prevent or withstand an attack with little damage 
to the BES and fewer implications on the public. However, if denying the enemy’s 
objectives does not suffice to deter, the U.S. can retaliate in order to further compel 
attackers from further aggression. Information collected from defensive layers such as 
Honeypots, host hardening programs, and access monitoring among other methods will 
force aggressors to leave behind a larger forensic footprint and allow the United States, as 
stipulated by the Presidential Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, to resolve the attribution problem. In addition to sharing intelligence, 
redundancy also allows the U.S. and OBES to observe cyber-attacks in real-time. 
Observations of behavior and methods during cyber-attacks can permit the U.S. to create 
an attack profile. For example, private hackers tend to rely on capabilities that are 
common with hacker communities such as DDoS attacks. In addition, some private 
hackers tend to focus more on style and seek publicity from their target audiences. In 
contrast, state-sponsored hackers such as PLA Unit 61398 are less likely to focus on style 
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and tend to lean towards a methodological or uniformed approach to cyber warfare. As 
such, state hackers are more likely to be patient in their attacks, waiting for the most 
opportunistic moment to strike whereas private hackers have a natural curiosity and 
prefer to explore their targeted system. State hackers also tend to avoid using 
conventional means such as DDoS attacks and prefer to use more sophisticated methods. 
This is a typical characteristic of a state-sponsored cyber-attack since private hackers are 
traditionally unable to finance such extravagant methods. As opposed to striking 
immediately after an attack, the U.S. will be in a position to tailor a response to its 
attributed attacker. Robustness, as discussed above, permits the BES to absorb a cyber-
attack, allows the U.S. to quarantine infected systems, localize damage, forensically 
analyze the strike, and ensure that retaliatory capabilities will remain operational. The 
information gathered in the analysis will not only make attribution easier to accomplish, 
but also permits the United States to specifically design a response while keeping in mind 
the strengths and weaknesses of its aggressor. Tailored responses, as discussed in Chapter 
3, circumvents the traditional problem areas for cyber-deterrence and allow the United 
States to punish its attacker with minimal fear of retaliation or escalation. Unlike an 
immediate response, a tailored response can occur at any point following the attack on 
the BES that is the most opportunistic for deterrence. Tailored responses would be 
executed by leading federal agencies with jurisdiction over the domain of the retaliatory 
strike, such as the NSA or USCYBERCOM in the event of a cyber response. Ultimately, 
the lack of the preceding phases for robustness would make mitigating damage to the 
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BES and gathering the necessary information to retaliate difficult to achieve by any 
number of means.
75
 
Conclusion 
Utilizing a defense in depth component as part of robustness will deny the 
objectives of cyber-attackers and create deterrence for future aggressors. Attackers will 
ultimately waste a substantial amount of their resources in an attempt to achieve their 
goals in attacking the electric grid. However, this concentrated effort will only result in 
their attack being absorbed and safely redistributed across the entire electric grid through 
ancillary lines. Robustness also contains a preventive aspect of its defense in depth 
component as it directly influences the decision calculus of the enemy, depending on the 
attacker’s aim. Like the first and second phases, the third phase of robustness gives 
stakeholders the opportunity to counter by tracing the aggressor’s signature. Attackers 
will have to devote more time to by-pass the first and second wave of robustness to even 
begin attacking the redundant electric grid. As this occurs, it will allow law enforcement 
agencies and their counter-parts in the U.S. Department of Defense to conduct cyber 
forensics during and after the attack. As attackers devote more time and resources to the 
attack, the United States government will have a greater probability to correctly attribute 
the attack to the correct perpetrator and take appropriate response measures. Cyber-
attacks can never be completely prevented; however, the electric grid must be strong 
enough to withstand those attacks that by pass the first and second layers of robustness
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Chapter 5: Assessing the Current and Proposed Strategies 
Robustness can emerge as a formidable USCDS to bolster the electric grid and 
influence the decision-calculus of cyber-attackers. The proposed strategy outlined in 
Chapter 4 can be more effective than the Obama Administration’s current focus on 
punitive deterrence? To assess whether the proposed strategy can be more potent in 
deterring cyber-attackers, this thesis will analyze robustness versus punitive deterrence 
against the factors influencing the effectiveness of cyber-deterrence. Both strategies will 
be assessed and a strategy will be less effective if it is consistently plagued by the factors 
associated with the realities of cyber deterrence.  The strategy affected by the least 
number of factors will be considered the most effective USCDS for the U.S. government 
and the U.S. Department of Defense to adopt.  
Can Attribution be Achieved? 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the current Obama Administration’s cyber 
strategy is focused primarily of punitive deterrence. Therefore, the United States will be 
required to successfully identify aggressors before a response can be made. Even if the 
government were to concentrate its intelligence resources to properly identifying the 
attackers, it would not improve its margin of success for attribution. As stated in Chapter 
1, the inability to remain on par with the evolution of malware is a glaring vulnerability 
for cyber-security. This holds true for attribution as well. The future may not make the 
task of attributing a cyber-attack to a single actor any easier. The most effective means of 
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attributing an attack to a single actor is to catch the perpetrator in the act. Increasing 
detection capabilities to ensure a state or non-state attacker is caught in the act can deter 
attackers from striking for a fear of getting caught. On the other hand, it can also 
embolden cyber-attackers to cloak themselves further to ensure that they cannot be 
identified during an attack. If perpetrators are already successfully masking their cyber-
attacks, they can just as easily increase their deceptive measures in parallel with increased 
detection measures by the target country. Once an attack had ended and the diagnostic 
forensics process has begun, the U.S. government and its private sector partners will find 
themselves once again in the complex process of determining who was behind the attack 
on the electric grid.
76
  
Unlike punitive deterrence, robustness is not hindered by the necessity of 
identifying the perpetrator behind a cyber-attack. The defense-in-depth strategy is 
designed to withstand attacks from both state and non-state actors regardless of the 
attack’s origins. As an added benefit, the strategy can allow the United States to more 
easily identify its attacker as a means for a tailored response. As more resources are 
operationalized to damage the BES, the added effort to destroy the grid increases the risk 
of exposure and attribution for the attacker. With this in mind, the option of attributing 
cyber-attacks relieves the United States from having to retaliate if it is not in the optimal 
position to do so. In regards to the attribution problem, robustness provides a clearly 
defined alternative in addition to the purely punitive deterrence policy.
77
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Can Cyber-Attackers Contest the Incident? 
The current strategy based on punitive deterrence is hindered by the requirement 
to furnish undisputable proof implicating the attacker in order to justify retaliation. To 
make matters more complex, cyber-attackers are fully aware of this challenge and will 
use it to protect themselves from any response by the United States. Cyber-attackers 
contest or deny their responsibility for an attack, thereby increasing the difficulty to 
respond since doubt remains regarding the true identity of the perpetrator. Even the risk 
of covert retaliation for a contested attack can have severe consequences to the United 
States. This is because without undisputable proof attributing a cyber-attacker, the United 
States risks losing credibility in the international community and drawing in a third party 
to the cyber conflict when retaliating. Therefore, punitive deterrence is weak in the sense 
that it is dependent on not only clearly identifying the exact perpetrator, but to also have 
the burden to prove it. As such, post-attack efforts made to gather information to remove 
the attacker’s contestability can be time consuming and detrimental to the defense of the 
Bulk Electric System, given the dynamic environment of cyberspace. As a result, 
contestability is no longer an issue when response is optional. Robustness provides the 
ability for the United States to absorb the attack without retaliation. Although proof 
would be required to justify a tailored response, retaliation is secondary to the United 
States’ resiliency through a defense-in-depth strategy. When the U.S. is in a prime 
position to retaliate, it can use the data already collected during the absorbed attack to 
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appropriately tailor a response. As a result, contestability is less of a hindrance for the 
proposed USCDS rather than the current Obama Administration’s strategy.78 
Must a Response be Scalable? 
The next assessment factor focuses on whether the strategies under review are 
influenced by scalability. The Obama Administration’s current punitive deterrent strategy 
is bound by scalability should retaliation ever be required following a cyber-attack. The 
United States must determine how to respond to enemy actions given the primary and 
secondary effects of an attack. The United States has already identified any cyber-attack 
on the electric grid or any other critical infrastructure as an act of aggression, but will it 
merit an official declaration of war? In addition, the United States must wrestle with the 
decision to respond electronically through cyberspace or conventionally through physical 
firepower. Both approaches will require an appropriate response, a difficult task given the 
lack of social norms or international regimes to regulate cyber conflicts. Any 
overwhelming response against a cyber-attacker can be interpreted as excessive by the 
international community. The United States is forced to remain cautious in the event of 
retaliation given the potential for scrutiny or the escalation of conflict by state and non-
state actors and any other unforeseen consequences. The question of how much force is 
appropriate for response has yet to be answered by any federal official and casts a cloud 
of uncertainty on whether or not the U.S. government can immediately respond to a 
cyber-attack.
79
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Unlike the current USCDS, robustness is not affected by the scalability issue. 
Unlike punitive deterrence, the new USCDS based on robustness strategy is primarily 
focused on denying the enemy by absorbing its attack. As such, the strategy is not 
plagued by the need to respond appropriately to every possible attack against the United 
States. However, if a tailored response is a favorable option for the United States to 
undertake, it can be done appropriately as discussed in Chapter 3. In combination with 
punitive deterrence options, the United States will be under a better strategic position to 
scale its response by using robustness over punitive deterrence. This will enable the U.S. 
to collect more information on the attacker during and after an attack. The information 
can then be used to carefully fashion a response towards the perpetrator of the attack. 
More importantly, retaliation under robustness is merely an option rather than a key pillar 
of the deterrence strategy, which does not ultimately undermine by the scalability issue as 
does the Obama Administration’s current strategy. 
Will the Code of Silence be an Issue? 
The inability to send a costly signal to cyber-attackers severely undermines the 
effectiveness of punitive deterrence. The willingness by the United States and its private 
corporations that own critical infrastructure to withhold or conceal instances of attacks 
emboldens enemies to strike. Although the revelation of a cyber-capability can diminish 
its effectiveness, so too can the covert nature of cyber retaliation. State and non-state 
actors as a group are presently unable to realize the destructive potential of electronic or 
kinetic response by the United States. Compounding the issue is that the United States is 
attacked electronically on a daily basis. This is similar to the use of atomic weapons on 
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Japanese cities during World War II. Following the war, the international community 
became well aware of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. 
Deterrence can never be achieved unless the United States can demonstrate its 
capabilities as it did in World War II and send a costly signal to its rivals that it has the 
capabilities to punish perpetrators.
80
 
The Code of Silence is less of a factor when the United States implements a 
deterrence policy based on defense-in-depth. Through robustness, the U.S. and private 
critical infrastructure operators can absorb each cyber-attack without having to divulge 
the incident in detail. Deterrence is achieved through objective denial rather than 
punishment. As such, a costly signal is transmitted to the international community 
through the aggressive hardening of vulnerable infrastructure. Cyber-attackers will factor 
the resiliency of critical infrastructure, such as the BES, into their decision calculus. 
Those deterred will view wasting resources as too costly to merit an attack. Attackers 
who choose to strike will be unsuccessful due to the fact that an attack can be discreetly 
absorbed and mitigated by the United States. In each case, the desire to conceal a cyber-
attack will not undermine the success of robustness in denying the enemy’s objectives. 
Is the Lack of Regulation an Obstacle? 
The current cyber deterrence framework does not rely upon government 
regulation to secure critical infrastructure.  In the absence of regulation, punitive 
deterrence can remain effective as it is designed to change enemy behavior through costly 
signals of force. The resiliency of critical infrastructure does not factor into the ability to 
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threaten cyber-attackers with a kinetic or electronic retribution.  As such, the anti-
regulation problem is not a hindrance factor for the current cyber deterrence strategy. 
This issue, on the other hand, can have severe limitations for robustness. The regulation 
issue can significantly damage the feasibility of robust deterrence and its focus on 
defense-in-depth and redundancy. Despite the reliability standards created by the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation, there is an absence in regulating cyber 
security for other sectors containing critical infrastructure. Building ancillary lines and or 
a layered defense as discussed in Chapter 4 is extremely costly, and so are redundancy 
measures in other sectors. Mandating the development of redundancy and other layered 
defenses through new U.S. cyber security regulations will increase costs for private CIOs. 
The private sector is unwilling to cover such costs, especially if there is little opportunity 
to increase revenue to cover the measures. This explains the opposition of many 
corporations to regulate cyber security measures in the private sector. So long as 
regulations on cyber security continue to be opposed by the private sector, the lack of a 
mandate to build redundancy and resiliency can severely impact the success of robustness 
as a formal USCDS.
81
 
Is the Spy Vs. Treaty Problem an Issue? 
Even if the United States can solve the attribution, contestability, and scalability 
issues hindering its ability to respond against a non-state actor, it must also address the 
possibility that the cyber-attacker is located in a country unwilling to allow a response 
against its own citizens. As discussed in Chapter 3, countries are fearful of the United 
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States, regardless if the attack occurred under their direction or not. This suspicion of 
espionage impedes the success of retaliation against non-state attackers hiding within 
these countries. An example of this is illustrated by the 2007 attack on Estonia’s 
cyberspace by Russian hackers. Despite the fact that the two countries had a formal treaty 
concerning cross-border crime, Russia objected to any investigation by Estonia or its 
allies within Russian cyberspace. If Estonia had decided to ignore Russia’s uncooperative 
response, it could have faced escalating the conflict with its larger neighbor. In observing 
this case, the current cyber deterrence strategy is severely challenged by the Spy vs. 
Treaty problem as it directly impacts the United States’ ability to retaliate against a 
cyber-attack if it originates from a hostile or uncooperative state. While the punitive 
deterrence is influenced by this issue, robustness remains unaffected by the cooperative 
nature of a country hosting non-state cyber-attackers. The strategy’s focus on layered 
defense and redundancy as opposed to an obligatory retaliation renders the problem a 
non-issue. Using the BES as an illustration, building ancillary lines in the national grid to 
deny the objectives of cyber-attacker does not require the blessing of a foreign state. 
Therefore, robustness is the preferred strategy to ensure the resiliency of critical 
infrastructure regardless of the attacker’s origins.82 
Are there Socio-Political Costs? 
When a cyber-attack is waged on America’s critical infrastructure, the 
implications can be catastrophic. Damage can range from blackouts and economic losses 
and the breakdown of social order. With this in mind, the current strategy can face the 
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entire spectrum of implications in the event that deterrence continues to fail. Regardless if 
the United States can respond through cyberspace or its military might or economic 
sanctions, punitive deterrence does not factor in the domestic implications that can 
possibly occur. Immediate retaliation, as outlined by the current strategy, is externally 
focused to address the threat against U.S. critical infrastructure and cyberspace. On the 
other hand, the current strategy is not designed to mitigate any cyber-attack on critical 
infrastructure or any other targets from within the United States. Logic bombs will not 
mitigate a breakdown in the BES or the shutdown of the Stock Exchange, but merely 
serve to incapacitate or destroy the perpetrators of cyber-attacks against the 
aforementioned targets. As such, the current strategy is negatively impacted by the socio-
political costs than can arise when punitive deterrence fails.  
The obstacles posed by socio-political costs are less of an issue when robustness 
is operationalized. Redundancy will allow critical infrastructure to mitigate attacks, limit 
damage, and reduce socio-political costs. The addition of ancillary lines or a transition to 
a distributed grid can limit the implications of a cyber-attack on the BES. For example, a 
blackout can be limited to an isolated neighborhood. As a result, critical services 
dependent upon electricity will largely remain operational and citizens affected by the 
cyber-attack will remain relatively unscathed. Based on the defensive components of 
redundancy, the new strategy for U.S. cyber deterrence is better suited to overcome 
socio-political costs in the event of a failure of deterrence. 
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Are there Economic Costs? 
As mentioned above, the private sector will be required to offset its costs in order 
to make critical infrastructure redundant and resilient. The economic costs of such an 
endeavor are staggering relative to relying on punitive deterrence and the economic costs 
of retaliation. Using the BES case, expanding the grid in order to create redundancy, 
alongside all of the costly measures of establishing a layered defense exceed the already 
budgeted costs of kinetic and electronic retaliation. Furthermore, the economic costs of 
robustness fall within the responsibility of the private CIOs in contrast to the current 
cyber deterrence strategy. Therefore, economic costs will emerge as an obstacle that can 
impact the effectiveness of the proposed USCDS, but are less of a hindrance for the 
current strategy.
83
 
Conclusion 
As illustrated by Table 1, the Obama Administration’s current strategy is mired 
by attribution, contestability, scalability, Spy VS Treaty, Anti-Regulation, and the Socio-
Political Cost problem. These factors severely limit the ability for the United States to 
deter its enemies in cyberspace. This assertion is corroborated by the thousands of cyber-
attacks that occur on a daily basis against critical infrastructure and networks across the 
United States.  
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With the limitations of the current strategy, the United States should turn to a new 
cyber deterrence strategy that can address the criteria for deterrence outlined in Chapter 
3. In Table 1, the proposed strategy can offer the United States the ability to eliminate 
many of the issues hindering punitive deterrence. Despite the economic cost problem and 
the necessity for all-encompassing national regulation delaying the implementation of 
robustness as a strategy, it remains unaffected by the other criteria serving as obstacles 
for deterrence. As such, this thesis contends that the best strategy to deter cyber-attackers 
is robustness; where objective denial is combined with a defense-in-depth approach. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the proposed strategy does not eliminate the need for 
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Table 1                            
                                           Addresses Cyber Deterrence Criteria 
 Current Strategy Proposed Strategy 
Problem YES NO YES NO 
Attribution X   X 
Anti-Regulation  X X  
Code of Silence X   X 
Contestability X   X 
Economic Costs  X X  
Scalability X   X 
Socio-Political Costs X   X 
Spy vs Treaty X   X 
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retaliation. Although retaliation as outlined in the proposed strategy will be subjected to 
the same criteria as the current punitive approach, it will less difficult to do so given the 
greater probability of attributing an attacker made possible by the resiliency and layered 
defense of targeted critical infrastructure.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations  
In Chapter 2, this thesis explored the history of U.S. cyber deterrence and 
concluded that the current strategy is ineffective due to the volume of cyber-attacks 
against the United States and the undeterred nature of cyber-attackers. Due to the failures 
of the Obama Administration’s USCDS, this thesis proposed an alternative cyber 
deterrence strategy based on robustness. The proposed USCDS called upon CIOs and the 
U.S. government to undertake a defense-in-depth approach to deterrence by building 
layered defenses and redundancy as means to deny the objectives of cyber-attackers. 
Furthermore, this thesis also argued that increasing the defensive posture of U.S. critical 
infrastructure would also bolster the U.S. capability to respond against cyber-attackers. 
Absorbing cyber-attacks will permit the U.S. to mitigate the effects of the attack while 
collecting information to circumvent the attribution problem and tailor a response to the 
attack.  
In Chapter 4, the BES was used to illustrate the implementation of the new 
USCDS based on robustness. This thesis described a defense-in-depth approach based on 
multiple layers of defense, such as Honeypots and Host Hardening measures, to increase 
the difficulty of penetrating the BES. Furthermore, this thesis proposed a number of 
redundancy measures, such as the building of ancillary lines, to absorb the effects of a 
cyber-attack should the preceding layers of defense fail to prevent or detect the attack. 
The necessity of such defensive layers is due to the realities of cybersecurity; the facts
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that a state cannot prevent all cyber-attacks from occurring and that our defensive 
capabilities will never achieve parity with the consistently-evolving offensive capabilities 
of cyber-attackers. Implementing robustness in the BES will deny cyber-attackers with 
limited resources to effectively disrupt and damage the electric grid. Furthermore, the 
robustness of the BES will grant the U.S. the time and information to tailor a response in 
the event the new USCDS is unable to originally deny the cyber-attacker from attacking 
the BES. 
Chapter 5 argued that a USCDS based on robustness is designed to overcome 
many of the obstacles plaguing the Obama Administration’s cyber strategy. This is due to 
the limitations of punitive deterrence in deterring cyber-attackers from striking U.S. 
critical infrastructure. While serving as United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
William J. Lynn III claimed in an article for Foreign Policy on the Pentagon’s cyber 
strategy, “deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefits to attackers 
than imposing costs through retaliation.”84 Deputy Secretary Lynn also asserts in Foreign 
Policy, “The challenge is to make the defenses effective enough to deny an adversary the 
benefit of an attack despite the strength of offensive tools in cyberspace.”85 Unlike the 
Obama Administration’s strategy, a new USCDS based on robustness does address this 
challenge by circumventing the attribution, contestability, and scalability problems that 
undermines a deterrence-based approach to cyber-attackers. In addition, a robustness-
based strategy will also deter cyber-attackers sheltered by rival states and mitigate the 
                                                             
84 Lynn, William, III. "Defending A New Domain." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (2010): 99-100. 
http://www.usna.edu/AcResearch/NASEC2012/William_Lynn_III_Defending_a_New_Domain.pdf. 
85 Ibid. 
 
 
77 
 
socio-political costs of a cyber-attack in the United States. Finally, the new USCDS will 
create resiliency in U.S. critical infrastructure that will allow public and private 
stakeholders to discreetly absorb and mitigate cyber-attacks. However, robustness is still 
limited by the lack of regulation to promote cyber defense in American critical 
infrastructure and the economic costs to build resilience. As a result, this chapter will 
discuss available options to mitigate the shortcomings of robustness.  
Solving the cost and regulatory problem will require policymakers to issue a 
mandate or legislation for increased physical and cyber security standards to protect 
critical infrastructure. A mandate has already been set in the Executive Order for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity issued by the Obama administration in 
February 2013. The executive order calls upon CIOs to work with the public sector to 
develop and implement risk-based standards. Such standards will include methodologies, 
procedures, and processes to mitigate cyber risks. Regulation over cyber security 
standards already exists in the BES, with the NERC enforcing industry security 
standards. With regulation already present in the BES, policymakers must expand to 
address critical infrastructure owned by private firms in the United States. Implementing 
regulation on all CIOs will promote a defensive posture for critical infrastructure that will 
bolster robustness as a cyber deterrence framework and protect vulnerable infrastructure 
from attack. For instance, regulation can mandate that each CIO must implement a 
certain level of defense-in-depth for their infrastructure and a certain degree of 
redundancy must be achieved in order preserve the continuity of service. In the case of 
the BES, a comprehensive standard can mandate OBES to build ancillary lines to ensure 
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that no more than 5% of households within a city limit will suffer through a blackout. In 
addition to bolstering defenses for critical infrastructure, regulation can also provide an 
avenue to solve the economic cost issue of creating a defensive posture to promote the 
robustness strategy of cyber deterrence.
 86
 
However, OBES can only be as effective in securing their infrastructure as the 
amount of revenue they can collect. OBES cannot devote their revenue to bolstering 
cyber defenses if they cannot raise their prices to offset the costs of building layered 
defenses and redundancy. Allowing operators of the BES to raise their prices will ensure 
that there is a steady stream of income devoted to a strong defense posture to prevent, 
absorb, or counter an attack against the BES. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) and state regulators for the BES understand the need to improve upon current 
BES infrastructure given the growing threat of cyber-attacks. However, regulators refuse 
to allow OBES to raise their prices to offset the costs of financing this defensive posture 
proposed by robustness. Regulators are concerned with the potential consumer backlash 
for raising service rates to bolster BES defenses against cyber-attackers. Thus, 
policymakers must create legislation to incentivize CIOs to invest in increasing resilience 
without placing the financial burden on the consumer. One approach is to award FEMA 
grants generally given to public authorities to private CIOs to improve the resilience of 
their critical infrastructure. Congress can also create legislation to encourage private 
investors to invest in local and state critical infrastructure. Such measures will ensure that 
CIOs cannot raise their rates to a level that is unsustainable for the consumer, thereby 
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abiding by pricing standards set by their regulators. Nevertheless, policymakers should 
also consider allowing CIOs to raise their fees to finance the implementation of 
robustness in their critical infrastructure. Although this may conflict with the interests of 
regulators, the U.S. government can create regulation to protect the consumer while 
bolstering robustness. One example is to mandate that all revenue generated by a price 
increase must be allocated to building resiliency. Ultimately, policymakers must take 
action to solve the economic cost and regulatory issues of building expensive layered 
defense and redundancy that presently serves as a limitation for robust cyber deterrence.
87
  
Even with a modest increase in revenue, CIOs will not be able to completely 
secure their critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks. With this in mind, a more cost-
effective method to bolster the resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure is to take a holistic 
approach to implementing the new USCDS based on robustness. CIOs must maximize 
their limited resources and invest enough into the robustness strategy to absorb the effects 
of a cyber-attack without sacrificing their ability to function as an enterprise. OBES 
should development assessment criteria to identify the most vulnerable segments of U.S. 
critical infrastructure that require additional layers of defense and redundancy. For 
example, OBES should identify which of their critical infrastructure can withstand a 
cyber-attack without degradation of service and those that will create a disruption. 
Operators of critical infrastructure must also prioritize the most critical of systems within 
their geographic area to more effectively decide how to allocate their limited resources. 
Without additional revenue to finance robustness, CIOs must resort to these holistic 
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measures in order to adequately bolster the resiliency of their critical infrastructure 
without exhausting their finite resources. Protecting essential functions rather than the 
critical infrastructure in its entirety will still add additional defensive layers and 
redundancy required to effectively deter cyber-attackers through the new USCDS. 
Furthermore, a holistic financial approach can allow CIOs to circumvent the economic 
costs of resiliency in order to make the new USCDS based on robustness more 
effective.
88
 
Ultimately, the success of the new USCDS based on robustness depends on the 
strength of a public-private sector partnership (PPP). PPPs are symbiotic relationships 
with the public sector dependent upon the success of private companies to stimulate the 
economy, whereas the public sector provides the security necessary for the survivability 
of the private sector. While the federal government serves multiple customers and 
missions, sharing intelligence with CIOs does not receive high priority.
89  The public 
sector must increase their collaboration with CIOs to improve efforts to protect critical 
infrastructure in the absence of formal regulatory policies. The Obama Administration’s 
Executive Order for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity is a positive step 
towards greater collaboration due to its recommendation to enhance the sharing of 
information related to critical infrastructure protection. However, federal, state, and local 
governments must take steps to further the public-private sector partnership by 
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incentivizing CIOs to make their critical infrastructure more robust in accordance with 
the new USCDS. For example, the public sector can offer subsidies or grants to 
collaborating CIOs willing to bolster their security. Likewise, CIOs must also improve 
collaborative efforts with their public sector partners by reducing their resistance to 
forming public-private sector partnerships. CIOs fear public-private sector partnerships 
may provide their competitors with a market advantage that may threaten their stream of 
revenue. The new USCDS based on robustness can only be achieved if public and private 
sector stakeholders in critical infrastructure are willing to partner on measures to improve 
resiliency.
90
 
With CIOs able to increase revenue and federal regulation mandating an increase 
in cyber defense, the proposed cyber strategy of robustness can address the outstanding 
criteria limiting its effectiveness. Passing legislation to raise revenue, incentivize private 
investors, or allocate FEMA grants to CIOs is the most effective approach to addressing 
the issues of economic costs and regulation in a new USCDS based on robustness. 
However, this solution is only attainable if the U.S. government can create policies 
promoting such revenue-raising measures. Given the uncertain timeframe of creating 
these policies, this recommendation is a long-term solution to an immediate issue to 
securing critical infrastructure. Although public-private sector partnerships can provide a 
short-term solution to defending critical infrastructure, the distrustful culture of private 
CIOs makes the challenge of strengthening public-private sector partnerships difficult to 
achieve. As a result, the best short-term approach to building resiliency in U.S. critical 
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infrastructure in accordance with robustness is to adopt a holistic approach. This allows 
CIOs to circumvent the issues of economic costs and regulation that limit the 
effectiveness of robustness. This measure will also allow CIOs to identify their 
vulnerabilities and efficiently allocate their limited resources to build layered defenses 
and redundancy for the most critical and vulnerable of their systems. 
Having all CIOs develop layered defenses and infrastructure redundancy, this new 
USCDS will better position CIOs to absorb attacks and collect information on their 
aggressors. Solving the regulation and economic cost issues also enhances the option of 
tailoring a response to the specific threat. Ensuring all CIOs are robust enough to absorb 
attacks also ensures that CIOs will have the ability to collect information that can be used 
to respond against the cyber-attacker at the most opportune time. Based on the shortfalls 
of the Obama Administration’s current cyber deterrence strategy, the new strategy is in a 
better position to protect the United States from dangers posed by state and non-state 
cyber-attackers. The U.S. was not wrong when it tried to recycle Cold War deterrence 
strategies for use in cyberspace. However, the Obama Administration’s current strategy is 
merely incomplete and lacks a critical component. This component is the difference 
between the current strategy and a new U.S. deterrence strategy that includes robustness; 
the use of objective denial with defense-in-depth and redundancy to withstand attacks and 
improve the ability to punish attackers for striking critical infrastructure through 
cyberspace. Only by implementing this critical component will U.S. cyber deterrence be 
complete and effective in deterring America’s enemies. Critical infrastructure owners can 
holistically work to make their systems more robust to a cyber-attack in the short-term; 
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however they must receive the necessary financial support through government aid or 
increased service to effectively bolster their defenses in the long-term.
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Glossary 
 
Attribution: The ability to accurately identify a perpetrator behind an attack. 
Bulk Electric System (BES): The collective elements of U.S. infrastructure for the 
operating, generating, and/or transmitting electricity at 100 kilovolts (kV).
91
 
Computer Network Attack (CNA): Actions taken to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves.
92
  
Contestability: The ability for an accused aggressor to contest the attribution of attack 
without punishment from the target. 
Critical Infrastructure Operator (CIO): The public and/or private sector owners of 
critical infrastructure within the United States. 
Defense: The use of force to repel an attack or to prevent an attack from making further 
progress and/or mitigate damage if attacked.
93
 
Defense-in-Depth: The act of implementing multiple layers of defense in order to 
weaken, exploit, and/or deter the aggressor.  
Deterrence: Coercing aggressive actors, whether with the threat of force or by denying 
their objectives, from attacking or undertaking a negative action.  Three types of 
deterrence are important to this study: 
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o Denial Deterrence: Deterring aggressive actors by denying their ability to 
achieve their strategic objectives, thereby undermining the enemy to the 
point where it begins to doubt its own strategy and thus does not engage in 
hostilities. 
o Punitive Deterrence: Deterring aggressive actors by threatening to 
respond with force against their valued interests or the aggressor itself in 
the event of an attack against the state. 
o Cyber Deterrence: Coercing aggressive actors from attacking the state 
via cyberspace, whether through denial and punishment, and maintaining 
their deterred behavior. 
Public-Private Sector Partnership (PPP): While the term is commonly used for any 
formal arrangement between the private sector and government to address and/or 
coordinate a shared area of responsibility, in the context of this research, it refers to a 
symbiotic relationship between public and private sector stakeholders over the 
administration, maintenance, and security of critical infrastructure in the United States. 
Redundancy: Implementing additional infrastructure components to ensure the 
survivability, or continuity of service, of the system should other components fail.
94
 
Regulators: Public and/or private sector organizations that oversee the administration, 
maintenance, and security of critical infrastructure in the United States. 
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): Components of the Bulk Electrical System (BES – see 
above) that transmit information to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA – 
see below) systems. 
Resilience: The ability for critical infrastructure to reduce the duration and/or magnitude 
of a computer network or physical attack.
95
  
Robustness: Fortifying critical infrastructure to absorb Computer Network Attacks 
(CNA – see above), ensure continuity of service, and deny the attacker’s objectives. 
Scalability: The extent to which a state can retaliate against an attack without violating 
the Just War Tradition.  
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Smart Grid: Electric grids that use information and communications technology to 
regulate the production and distribution of electricity.
96
 
Smart Meters: Electrical meters that process data on energy consumption while relaying 
information back to the utility for monitoring and billing purposes.
97
 
Spy-VS-Treaty: The resistance by states to allow other states access to their network for 
investigative purposes, despite formalized agreements, due to cybersecurity threats.  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): Systems used to monitor and 
control equipment within the Bulk Electrical System (BES – see above).98  
Synchrophasors: Technology used to monitor in real-time to detect disturbances, predict 
instability, and control the problem. 
Tailored Response: Using information collected from an attributed CNA to design a 
response against the aggressor at the most opportune moment. A tailored response can 
also be used to deny and deter potential aggressors. 
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